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A THEORETICAL EXPOSITION OF EXPORT
hoc basis by adopting policies they deem appropriate in order to achieve 
their goals. Apparently, such actions contradict the working rules of global 
agreements. Export subsidies and surrogate practices, viz. subsidies on 
research and development (R&D) have been escalated with the growing 
world antagonism, rising costs, and gradually growing antiquated factories. 
The main objectives of R&D incentives remain the cost reduction or the 
increased efficiency in the “laboratory” level. The endorsement of export 
motives, in the context of an imperfectly competitive world, aims primarily 
at the capturing of a larger share in world markets and the maximization of 
the domestic welfare.
The analysis of export and R&D incentives has generated a prominent 
dichotomy in the literature. The supporters of these strategies claim that 
such motives justify the drain on public resources. Planning for export and 
R&D subsidies should not be a matter of “either, or” but rather a case of 
“both, and”. Such subsidies should be endorsed to stimulate industrial 
exports, alleviate balance-of-payments problems, and diversify the economy. 
R&D subsidies dedicated to the expansion of knowledge can be justified on 
national and international grounds for the scientific upgrading. Hence, one 
wonders why some governments are outraged by foreign subsidies? This 
distortion is anyway the misfortune of the subsidizing nation which benefits
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others who enjoy cheaper foreign products. The chaotic trade experience 
has recorded some erroneous cases wherein specific governments have 
protested the subsidization of foreign products which were initially sub­
sidized by them. Straightforward, trade subsidies should be designed in a 
manner a) to avoid discrimination among industries; b) revitalize the econ­
omy; c) satisfy the comparative advantage argument; and d) justify the 
traditional national security, infant industry and import-substitution theories.
Presently, in a theoretical specification, we seek to assess the efficiency 
of export and R&D subsidies. In view of these widespread intervention 
schemes, we admittedly abstain from a myriad of other relevant issues. 
At this point it is pertinent to mention that outright subsidies are rare 
and henceforth their quantification is notoriously difficult. The paper is 
organized as follows: In Section 2 we set up a model wherein the home 
government endorses export and R&D subsidies \  In Sections 3 and 4 we 
analyze some repercussions generated by these subsidies, and in Section 5 
we conclude.
2. Preliminary Analysis
I. Consider a duopoly between domestic firm 1 and its rival foreign 
firm 2. Both firms produce a substitute product consumed domestically and 
abroad. Under non-cooperative comparative statics, these firms determine 
the level of their R&D in Phase I and decide the output level in a Nash 
(1950) equilibrium in Phase II. First, by following Spencer and Brander 
(1983) we analyze Phase II; for firm i (i — 1, 2 in superscripts) let:
q — output
C =  variable costs, excluding those for R&D
(p =  marginal costs
0 =  revenue
8 — R&D level
A =  R&D costs
n =  profits
a, s — export and R&D subsidies, respectively. 1
1 Opponents condemn such subsidies and focus on their adverse consequences. H ong (1976) 
has dealt with the oversubsidization of some inefficient industrial sectors of S. Korea. I slam 
(1969) studied three schemes of export subsidies in Pakistan. Kostecki (1978, p. 56-78) consid­
ered export subsidies only as temporary measures adopted to safeguard the BOP. H ufbauer and 
Erb (1984) offer a descriptive analysis of export subsidies. Definitions and lists of 12 sorts of 
export subsidies are cited in Gatt (1979).
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We begin with the variable profits n1 for the domestic firm 1 which are:
»1 (q \ q2; Sx) =  0 1 q2) - C  (q1; 8X) -  XW (1)
where outputs q1 and q2 are substitutes and 0 1 {qx, q2) is the world demand 
for the produced good. Given that output q depends directly on the R&D 
level 8, then:
q1 =  (51, 82) and q2 =  f 2 (51, <52) (2)
If subscripts denote derivatives:
02 <  0 (3a)
a>\2 <  0 (3b)
viz., the variable revenue of firm 1 declines with both an increased output 
of firm 2 (eq. 3a) and with cross output (eq. 3b).
From the cost point of view, accelerated R&D (8) raises C at a declin­
ing rate as 8 increases:
Cg <  0 and CgS >  0 (4a)
Also, marginal costs <p (=  dcp/dq) fall as 8 increases:
q)x >  0 and <Pg <  0 (4b)
Interestingly, Scherer (1967) based on a theoretical and empirical evidence 
proved that the cost of R&D is inversely related to time; then R&D costs 
are increasing and strictly convex in production q. This may be represented 
by a quadratic funcion of X:
C1 =  -  a 1 (A1)2 (5)
2
where a 1 >  0 is inversely related with the cost effectiveness of firm l ’s 
R&D.
The Nash equilibrium in output is characterized by first- and second- 
order conditions for profit maximization:
n\ =  <l>\ (q1, q2) -  «p 1 (tf1; 51) =  0 (6)
» ii =  0 ii -  v l  <  0
If the own-effects of domestic firm 1 on marginal profits dominate the 
cross-effects, then:
3 8 8 BOBBY E. APOSTOLAKIS
A =  71^22 -  n\2n2l >  0 (8)
in order to ensure global stability of the equilibrium.
In conjunction with eq. (8), where A >  0, a total differentiation of eq. 
(6) with respect to q1 and q2 yields:
fi =  <PWn/A > 0 (9)
Q = - 9W2JA <  0 ( 10)
Hence, the Nash equilibrium output of firm 1 increases with its own R&D 
(eq. 9) but decreases with the R&D of the foreign rival firm 2 (eq. 10).
II. Hereinafter, we analyze Phase I in which the duopoly determines 
its own R&D level. Granted that output depends on R&D (eq. 2), profits 
can be expressed as a function of 8' and S2. Let u ‘ be the profit function of 
domestic firm 1:
a2), (12)
The first-order condition in a Nash equilibrium for R&D is:
^l1 =  -  c\ -  A1 =  0 (13)
Since n l =  0 (from eq. 6) and then eq. (13) becomes:
=  02^1 -  C J.- A1 =  0 (14)
The second-order condition is:
n\\ =  02^ii +  {df\/dSy) -  <p^\ -  C\s <  0 (15)
With condition (8) still in order:
A* =  n \ \n 2 -  n\l2n*22 >  0 (8a)
viz., the own-effects of firm 1 s R&D on marginal profits dominate the cross 
impacts. Thus, n 12 <  0 means that an increase in firm 2’s R&D will normal­
ly reduce the effect of firm l ’s R&D on its own (firm 1) profits.
Here, we shall show that the duopoly fails to minimize costs when it 
applies excess R&D in its production. If the condition for total cost minimi­
zation is:
Cg  +  A =  0 (1 6 )
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firm 1, owing to eqs. (4a) and (14), sets:
C\ +  X =  0 ^ 1  >  0 (17)
which implies that the utilized R&D exceeds the required R&D in the total 
cost minimization process; hence, there is a bias for excess use of R&D at 
any level of output.
A comment on eq. (17) is pertinent: Consider that firm 1 is involved 
with R&D, that firm 2 reacts submissively (i.e. apathetically), and that 
firm 1 correctly prognoses the reaction of its rival firm 2. If C >  0 are 
the fixed costs for R&D, a production time-lag T >  0 is required to 
complete R&D. The ex ante profits of firm 1 will be n\ G where G is a 
random variable. If the R&D is successful, then G =  g; if the R&D fails 
(or C is excessive), then G =  1 -  g =  /. Finally, assume that firm 2 
becomes aware of the random variable G, some t periods (t <  T) after 
firm 1 undertakes R&D.
Let the expected present value of firm 1 be:
V1 = - C  +  T+Z l rE (n\ G) +  I  rE {n\ G) (18)
r  ’ T + t
where r is the discount rate, 1 >  r >  0, and E (•) is the expected value 
operator. Firm 1 will undertake R&D if and only if:
C <
pT + 1
1 -  r £ K g)
+
jT _ yT + t
1 -  r
E ( 7 Z { G ) (19)
Obviously, firm 1 wishes to face a submissively behaving firm 2; that is:
G (1 -  r1) {tt1!it -  ?r^} +  f { n \ j  -  n\ f) >  0 (20)
We need to justify eq. (20): Plausibly, n\ g >  n\ g which means that 
firm 1 prefers its R&D to succeed rather than fail. If n \ j  >  n \j, then 
condition (20) holds. As C increases, firm l ’s expected profits increase 
discontinuously. Hence, the expected profits of firm 1 owing to R&D are not 
a monotonic function of the fixed costs C for R&D. Firm 1 might prefer a 
costly R&D strategy over an inexpensive one since profits grow with 
increased fixed costs for R&D. This contradicts eq. (17) which is concerned 
with the overutilization cf R&D in the production process of firm 1 2.
2 The analysis of the submissive reaction of firm 2 requires the introduction of subgame 
strategies. Interestingly, Katz and Shapiro (1987) discuss the post-development dissemination of
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3. R&D Subsidies
Adoption of R&D subsidies (s) will enable the domestic firm 1 to 
capture a larger share of the world market and subsequently increase the 
earnings of its home country. According to eq. (1), the profits of firm 1 
after the inclusion of a subsidy (y) per unit of R&D will be:
7T1 (S\ S2; j) =  (q \ q2) -  O  (q1; i 1) -  (A1 -  s) 51 (21)
subject to eq. (2). The first-order condition is:
n\ (S\ S2; s) =  0 and n\ =  0. 






This implies Sj =  -  n22/A  >  0 since A >  0 by eq. (8) and n\2 <  0 by eq. 
(15). Also,
S2 =  (7z2JA) <  0 if tt21 <  0 and S2 =  (n2jA )  >  0 if ji21 >  0 3.
Thus, home R&D subsidies will enhance domestic R&D and reduce (increase) 
foreign R&D provided n2i <  0 (n21 >  0).
The optimal R&D subsidy is found at the moment of the net domestic 
benefit Bl (i.e., the profits of each domestic firm less subsidy costs) maximi­
zation:
B1 (s) =  7T1 (51, S2; s) -  sS1 (23)
The question now is, what the government does by subsidizing R&D that 
the firm cannot do? The level of R&D chosen by the domestic firm is that 
which maximizes its profits within the confines of the behavior of the 
two-stage Nash equilibrium. If a firm violates this equilibrium, it may earn 
lower profits. Government subsidies may alter the cost structure of a firm 
and change the set of actions compatible with the two-stage Nash equilib­
rium which yield higher profits.
R&D. Then the imitating firm 2 benefits and the conventional results in the economics of R&D
are abandoned. Bernstein and Nadiri (1989) studied the effects o f R&D spillovers and estimated 
the social and private rates of R&D returns for several industries.
3 Normally, increases in foreign R&D will reduce the effect of domestic R&D on the 
profits o f firm 1: 7t2l <  0.
EXPORT AND R&D SUBSIDIES 3 9 1
From eq. (23) the first-order condition of the welfare maximizing 
R&D subsidy is:
dBl/ds =  7t\S] +  n\8j +  n] -  S' -  s8] =  0 (24)
From eq. (21), the partial derivative n] +  51; from eq. (14), n*1 =  0; 
since S2s =  <5* (dS2/dS1), then eq. (24) reduces to:
dBfds =  {n\ (d82/d8l) -  r}^1 =  0 
or:
s =  n\ (d82/d8x) (25)
which is the R&D subsidy. Hence, the optimal domestic R&D subsidy maxi­
mizes the profits of firm 1 and reduces the R&D of firm 2. This is what the 
government can achieve for the domestic firm that the latter cannot do for 
itself; if enacted R&D subsidies remain, the firm enjoys higher profits and 
thus bypasses any price wars.
Although a thorough analysis of duopolistic strategies falls beyond 
present interests, we briefly examine the reaction of firm 2 when cost 
effectiveness for R&D favors firm 1 (i.e., a 1 in eq. (5) declines). This 
situation enhances the present value of firm 1 (eqs. 5 and 11) and decreases 
the present value of firm 2. If firm 2 reacts submissively to firm l ’s lead, it 
will further lag in R&D and innovation. Unless firm 2 reacts aggressively, 
firm l ’s superiority in R&D will be preserved and even expanded. This will 
force firm 2 to retreat when firm l ’s antagonism becomes unrivaled. Then, 
firm 2 chooses to abstain from the high-tech industry which requires ad­
vanced R&D and concentrates in the production of less sophisticated prod­
ucts. It is concluded that the efficient firm 1 will accelerate innovation. If 
firm 2 reacts aggressively (submissively) it will perform more (less) R&D. The 
present value of the relatively more efficient firm 1 increases if firm 2 
behaves submissively; hereafter, firm 1 becomes the technological leader. 4
4. Export Subsidies
The government, now, enacts both R&D and export subsidies (cr) 
before R&D is actually applied. Thus, export subsidies affect both the 
choice of output and R&D directly. Then, the profit function of firm 1 
becomes:
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** ( il> S2’ s’ =  P  W , q2) ~ <Pl W \ S1) +  aq1 -  (A1 -  s) 8' (26) 
where:
q1 =  f 1 (S1, 82; a), q2 =  ?  (S\ 82; a)
and both S1 and S2 depend on a and r. Also, the benefit function becomes:
B1 U  a) =  n1 (S\ 82- s, a) -  aql -  j i 1 (27)
Taking the derivative of B1 with respect to s and solving for j  yields 4
s =  n 2 (dS2/dS1) — a (dql/dSl) (28)
Y . j  ° - ^ - (2? ) coincides with eq. (25) which represents the R&D 
subsidies. With the presence of <7, though, r is reduced by the positive
erm a (dq /d8 ). Hence, with the adoption of export subsidies, R.&D subsi­
dies deteriorate.
■s The flrst-°rder condition of eq. (27) with respect to export subsidies a
a =  (*1% +  f \£ ) /(d q fd o )  -  {s8xJ  (dq1 /  da)} (29)
Solving eqs. (28) and (29) together yields:
5 = -  <  0 (30)
and
a ~  {n2 (d82/dS1) +  fj\£\}/(dql/dSl) > 0  (31)
Thus, increased export subsidies for the products of firm 1 enhance its own 
output and reduce the production of foreign firm 2. The optimum export 
subsidies <7 «re positive (eq. 31) but the optimal R&D subsidy s, in the 
presence of export subsidies, is negative (eq. 30). This suggests that firms 
envying subsidies should not adopt R&D subsidies. The government should 
subsidize a firm s R&D when export subsidies are absent. Yet, one should 
eep in mina the problem of R&D overutilization.
When firm 1 accepts export subsidies -  after the application of R&D -  
it maximizes profits as:
7T1 ( 8 \  8 2- (7) =  0 1  ( q \  q2 )  _  9 X g l )  +  a S l
(3 2 )
Its arithmetic derivation is available on request.
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Using Cramer’s rule, as in eq. (22), yields:
q\ -  dqx/do =  -  ti22/A  >  0 (33)
q2„ =  dq2/do =  n \jA  < 0  (34)
where A has been shown in eq. (8). Since q\ >  0, an increase in export 
subsidies enhances domestic exports given that nz22 <  0 from eq. (7) and 
A >  0 from eq. (8). Also, domestic export subsidies depress the output of 
the foreign firm (eq. 34).
The comparative static effects of export subsidies in firm 1 are summa­
rized below:
i) Drop the world price of the subsidized product-.
Proof: If total revenue is (p1 =  p1q1, then the change in price (p) is equal to 
the slope of the inverse demand times the change in total quantity:
dpfdo  =  p1 (q* +  q2a) =  p1 (jr§j -  n22)/A <  0 (35)
since price p >  0, n2l <  0 (ft. 3), n22 <  0 (eq. 15), and A >  0 (eq. 8).
ii) Increase domestic profits:
Proof. From the total differentiation of n1 with respect to a:
dnl/do — nlq\ +  n2q2 +  dnl/do (36)
Since 7T1 =  0 (eq. 6), dnl/da =  S1 (eq. 32), and q2 <  0 (eq. 34), then eq. 
(36) is positive.
iii) Depress foreign profits:
Proof: Along the same lines:
dn2/da =  7r2̂  +  n2q2a < 0  ' (37)
iv) Enhance the domestic net welfare:
Proof. Rewrite eq. (27) as:
B1 (a) =  n1 (S\ S2; a) -  oql (38)
The derivation of eq. (38) with respect to a yields:
dB1 ¡da =  71* -  q1 -  aq\ =  q Y q 2a -  aq* (3 9 )
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due to eq. (36). Setting dBl/do =  0 yields:
a =  qipiS1J q \  >  0 (40)
that is, a marginal increase in the export subsidies of the products of 
domestic firm 1 improves the home welfare.
5. Epilogue
Nationalism and credibility, deficits and debts, devaluations and terms 
of trade are indicative arguments used by central governments to openly 
intervene in trade despite of their international commitments. Presently, 
under a duopoly of a substitute good produced in two countries and 
exported to the rest of the world, we established some non-cooperative 
comparative statics. We mainly showed the repercussions generated by the 
subsidization of the home exports and R&D.
The theoretical findings are:
R&D Subsidies:
i. Yield a dubious result concerning the over-utilization of R&D in 
production. It is stated that a) expected profits from R&D are not a mono­
tonic function of fixed costs for R&D, and b) profits grow with increased 
fixed costs for R&D.
ii. Enhance domestic R&D and profits; domestic R&D subsidies re­
duce foreign R&D.
iii. Increase domestic innovation in the presence of cost-effectiveness in 
the domestic R&D. Whether firm 2 performs more (less) R&D depends on 
its aggressive (submissive) reaction.
Export Subsidies:
i. Reduce its own (domestic firm 1) R&D subsidies.
ii. Increase domestic output, profits, and welfare; depress the output 
and profits of rival firm 2.
iii. Are preferred to the domestic R&D subsidies.
iv. Depress the world price of the subsidized good.
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ESPOSIZIONE TEORICA D EI SUSSIDI ALL’ESPORTAZIONE E ALLA 
RICERCA E SVILUPPO
In un contesto teorico di un duopolio con due paesi, vengono esaminate 
alcune ripercussioni dei sussidi all’esportazione e alla ricerca e sviluppo su una 
impresa nazionale. In  particolare, vengono determinate le variazioni della ricerca 
e sviluppo, della produzione e dei profitti di entrambe le imprese. Vengono an­
che esaminati i cambiamenti di benessere, dovuti ai sussidi nel paese che li offre. 
Gli effetti dei sussidi alla ricerca e sviluppo sono studiati separatamente da quelli 
dei sussidi all’esportazione. Questi effetti differiscono per ragioni evidenti.
Il successo dei sussidi nazionali alla ricerca e sviluppo dipende, ceteris 
paribus, da se l’impresa rivale reagisce in modo aggressivo o no. Inoltre, gli effet­
ti di statica comparata dei sussidi all’esportazione si concentrano sul prezzo 
mondiale del prodotto sussidiato, sui profitti nazionali ed esteri e sul benessere 
netto nazionale. Nel complesso, l ’impresa nazionale preferisce sussidi all’esporta­
zione a sussidi alla ricerca e sviluppo.
.
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UNE ANALYSE INTERPRÉTATIVE 
DU MODÈLE CYCLIQUE DE FANNO
par
Cristina N ardi Spiller *
« Les facteurs extérieurs qui conditionnent existent toujours dans 
le sens qu’il y a dans chaque situation, selon toute probabilité, 
un niveau maximum du taux de l’épargne, un niveau maximum 
d’augmentation de la population ou un flux maximum de nouvel­
les idées, pouvant chacun d’entre eux être atteint. Mais le fait est 
que les valeurs effectives de ces variables, dans une société et à 
une époque données, ne sont pas déterminées par leurs valeurs 
maximales théoriques, mais peuvent eîre ralenties ou accélérées 
suivant le comportement des chefs d’entreprise susceptibles 
d’exercer une poussée en avant ou en arrière » (Kaldor, 1984, p. 
92).
1. Introduction
Le sujet abordé par Fanno fait depuis longtemps l’objet de nombreuses 
études et de recherches qui présentent le plus souvent un caractère unilaté­
ral, car elles tendent à privilégier un seul aspect de cette problématique si 
complexe. Si l’Auteur se réfère aux analyses et aux réflexions les plus 
significatives, ce n’est certes pas pour accorder à ces théories une position
* Université di Vérone, Faculté de Sciences Economiques, Vérone (Italie).
Cet essai a bénéficié de l’aide du Ministère de l’Université et de la Recherche Scientifique 
et Technologique. Il a été présenté le 11 septembre 1992 au cours du Colloque International 
« Les Mouvements de Longue Durée dans la Pensée Economique » qui s’est tenu à l’Université 
de Montpellier I.
J’adresse toute ma reconnaissance à Madame ML. Manfredini Gasparetto, élève de Marco 
Fanno, qui a bien voulu aborder quelques thèmes de la pensée du grand économiste et m’a 
permis de consulter de nombreux ouvrages de sa vaste bibliothèque, aujourd’hui difficiles à 
trouver. Il va sans dire que cet article n’engage que ma propre responsabilité.
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dominante, mais bien pour les insérer dans le cadre de son schéma théori­
que,  ̂ lequel, résultant d une plus grande ampleur, assume une dimension 
générale. On retrouve constamment chez Fanno cette volonté de dépasser 
les étroites limites conceptuelles d’un système interprétatif rigide, comme 
nous l’avons déjà souligné à propos de son analyse sur le cours des changes 
(Nardi Spiller, 1992).
L’approche spéculative qui en dérive, présente des « points de con­
tact » avec d’autres théories: Fanno lui-même le reconnît dans sa Prefazione 
(1947, p. XII). D ’où les références possibles aux analyses de Keynes (1930, 
1936) et de Schumpeter (1912, 1928, 1939) pour les rapports qui en 
découlent, respectivement, quant au déséquilibre entre épargne et investisse- 
ment, et à 1 impact des innovations techniques sur le système économique; 
encore que ces dernières puissent expliquer les fluctuations de longue durée 
de Kondratieff (1926), mais non les fluctuations ordinaires (Fanno, 1956, p. 
406). L’interprétation de Pigou (1927) est sensible là où les impulsions 
originelles des fluctuations sont ramenées à de nombreuses motivations, 
quoique Fanno aborde et envisage le problème d’une tout autre façon. On 
relève encore des éléments communs à l’oeuvre de Mitchell (1927) qui 
discerne, dans les variations enregistrables du niveau des profits, les facteurs 
les plus immédiats et directs des changements de conjoncture, et considère, 
par ailleurs, le facteur monétaire et bancaire comme un élément passif pen­
dant les phases des oscillations, excepte dans la période de transition entre 
une conjoncture favorable et une conjoncture défavorable. Des éléments de 
parenté se retrouvent également dans la structure doctrinale de Fisher 
(1932), à propos des endettements excessifs, et dans l’apport de Robertson 
(1915), quant a 1 importance du renouvellement périodique des équipements 
industriels. L’on ne saurait encore oublier Aftalion (1913), là où ce dernier 
souligne le relief que prend dans les mouvements cycliques la différence 
entre le volume de capitaux dont la production est entreprise à un moment 
donné et 1 activité nécessaire pour compléter les capitaux, dont la production 
commence par contre précédemment. Par ailleurs, dès 1912, Fanno greffe et 
coordonne sur sa propre théorie des cycles économiques, en tant que partie 
intégrante, la théorie wicksellienne « des relations entre prix, escompte et 
intérêt (profits) » (Manfredini Gasparetto, 1984, p. 240).
Il n en dem eure pas m oins, rappelons-le, que le schém a in te rp ré ta tif de 
F anno a une iden tité  b ien  spécifique, cen trée sur le  rôle des profits « anim a­
teurs » des m ouvem ents auxquels les économ ies sont su jettes e t sur le 
principe-base des écarts de tem ps ', dérivant de  la durée des processus
1 Les écarts de temps ne sont de toute façon pas les seuls susceptibles d’être commis. Il
UNE ANALYSE INTERPRÉTATIVE DU MODÈLE CYCLIQUE DE FANNO 3 9 9
productifs et relevables dans la stimulation des fluctuations. Nous nous 
proposons ici, de dégager la valeur de l’apport de notre Auteur, que nous 
présenterons schématiquement, et de mettre en évidence les projections 
potentielles de sa pensée dans le cadre de la réalité économique actuelle.
2. Le modèle combinatoire cy cio-trend de Fanno
Dans l’optique de Fanno, le modèle concentré sur l’hypothèse de trend 
stationnaire n’est pas réaliste, étant donné que seuls les modèles combinant 
le cycle et le développement d’une longue période rendent plausible une 
interprétation du phénomène en cours, bien que les transpositions virtuelles 
puissent éveiller une certaine perplexité, si l’on sait que
« Le trend est calculé sur la base d’observations tirées du passé; il appartient au passé, 
et c ’est vraim ent un acte de foi que de supposer que le passé est encore significatif. Un  
acte de foi d ’autant plus contraignant que la période sur laquelle se calcule le trend est 
de longue durée » (H icks, 1982, p. 334).
Si l’on considère le schéma conceptuel de l’Auteur italien, basé sur la 
dynamique d’expansion * 2 qui caractérise les systèmes capitalistes, où l’inves­
tissement dépend pour la plupart des décisions des chefs d’entreprise pri­
vée, il est possible de tracer trois courbes fondamentales, soit, respective­
ment, la ligne de l’expansion potentielle, la ligne de l’expansion séculaire et 
la ligne de l’expansion effective.
« C ’est à l ’intérieur de ce schéma défini par ces trois courbes, que se déroule le 
processus d ’expansion des systèmes et que se développe par la la tendance de ces 
derniers à fluctuer » (Fanno, 1956, p. 354).
est également possible de commettre des écarts de qualité, de quantité et de coût (Fanno, 
1947, chap. III et chap. XI). L’on commet des écarts de qualité lorsque l’on produit des biens 
qui ne correspondent pas aux goûts des consommateurs (c’est le cas des biens directs) ou aux 
nécessités technico-économiques des producteurs (cas des biens-capitaux). Les écarts de quantité 
adviennent chaque fois que le volume de production est inférieur ou supérieur au volume de la 
marchandise vendue au prix de revient. Enfin, les écarts de coût s observent lorsque, entrepre­
nant une activité productive de certains biens et prévoyant certains coûts, ceux-ci se révèlent 
par la suite tellement supérieurs que le maintien de la production paraît « désastreux » (Fanno, 
1947, pp. 297-298 et 1956, pp. 311-312).
2 Schneider (1966) précise parfaitement la différence qui sépare, dans l’analyse de Fanno, 
l’expansion de la croissance. La première caractérise la longue période, puisque c’est un 
processus d’augmentation des biens d’équipement et de la capacité productive des systèmes, 
alors que la seconde intéresse la courte durée.
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Les rapports existant entre ces trois courbes ne sont ni immédiats ni faciles, 
d autant plus que le modèle de Fanno n’a pas un aspect formel; aussi est-il 
nécessaire, comme le soutient Marrama (1974, p. 225 et p. 228), de procé­
der, du moins à certains moments du traité, à une interprétation de la 
pensée de l’Auteur.
L’expansion potentielle d’un système économique est liée à trois fac­
teurs : la croissance de la population, les progrès techniques de la production 
et la tendance du public a l’épargne. Toutefois, ces facteurs ne sont pas en 
mesure, seuls, de déterminer le processus d’expansion. Ils expriment seule­
ment la possibilité de créer un revenu dans la mesure où sont pleinement 
utilisées les ressources disponibles. En somme, nous avons là une figure 
anticipée du ceiling hicksien (voir Fig. 1, en échelle semi-logarithmique).
Fig . 1: Le modèle de Fanno.
Légende: I: temps; Y: revenu; AP: ligne de l’expansion potentielle; BS: ligne de l’expansion 
séculaire; BE: ligne de l ’expansion effective; AB: trend stationnaire.
Ces éléments déterminent donc la mesure et le rythme de l’expansion 
potentielle qui devient réelle quand les entreprises réalisent de nouveaux 
investissements, lesquels, à leur tour, sont étroitement liés à la faisabilité 
d obtenir, à la suite de leur réalisation, des profits suffisamment rémunéra­
teurs. C’est alors que démarre, en retard par rapport à la ligne de l’expansion 
potentielle, la ligne de 1 expansion séculaire qui avance ensuite sans interrup­
tion, puisque
« la tendance des investissements privés à diminuer, au fur et à mesure qu’ils sont 
réalisés, la distance entre développement réel et développement potentiel, et la chute 
des profits qui s’ensuit, est continuellement compensée par la tendance opposée, déri­
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vant du cours ascendant de la ligne de l’expansion potentielle » (Marrama, 1974, p. 
226).
Ce qui caractérise le plus la ligne de l’expansion séculaire, c’est qu’elle 
est parallèle à celle de l’expansion potentielle, mais il ne pourrait pas en être 
autrement.
« En effet, si la première avait une inclinaison supérieure à la seconde sur l’axe des 
abscisses, la distance entre les deux droites tendrait à diminuer, ce qui signifierait que le 
profit minimum tombe en-dessous du niveau à partir duquel sont entrepris de nouveaux 
investissements. Ces derniers seraient donc réduits jusqu’au moment où, grâce au cours 
croissant de l’expansion potentielle, serait rétablie la distance entre cette dernière et la 
ligne de l’expansion séculaire. Vice versa, si cette ligne avait une inclinaison inférieure 
sur l’abscisse à la ligne de l’expansion potentielle, la distance entre les deux droites 
tendrait à augmenter, ce qui entraînerait des perspectives de profits plus rémunérateurs 
et une hausse consécutive des investissements » (Marrama, 1974, pp. 226-227).
C’est ainsi que se constituent les profits de développement (profitti di 
sviluppo), soit, sur la Fig. 1, la distance AP-BS.
D’un point de vue formel, la droite BS est semblable à la droite qui, 
dans l’analyse de Hicks (1950) marque le mouvement du trend que suit le 
système économique au cours d’une longue période, quoiqu’elle présente 
une différence importante. En effet, chez Hicks 3, ce sont les investissements 
autonomes qui jouent le rôle principal, tandis que chez Fanno, la BS est 
reliée à tous les investissements, quels qu’ils soient, que la croissance de la 
ligne de l’expansion potentielle rend peu à peu profitables 4. Toutefois, loin 
d’être stable et infinitésimal, le volume des investissements apparaît irrégu­
lier, ce qui entraîne des rectifications au niveau du revenu, de la consomma­
tion, de l’épargne. C’est ainsi que naissent les profits de conjoncture (profit­
ti congiunturalï), réalisables quand les variations de salaire et, d’une façon 
générale, toutes ces variations virtuelles qui perturbent les coûts des diffé­
rents inputs, se produisent en retard par rapport aux changements des prix 
concernant la sphère de production.
Fanno, qui a finement observé les liens unissant le cours des salaires et 
la dynamique des prix, estime que
« 1) au début des phases ascendantes, ils [les salaires] restent stationnaires ou presque, 
tandis que les prix ont déjà commencé à augmenter; 2) par la suite, quand la phase
3 II est surprenant de constater que Hicks ne cite point Fanno, alors que les recherches de 
ce dernier sont précisément antérieures.
4 Fanno (1933) analyse une situation où le système «reste embrouillé» dans une phase 
de récession. Cf. à ce sujet le commentaire de Magliulo (1992).
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ascendante est achevée, les prix et les salaires augmentent simultanément; 3) au début 
des phases décroissantes, les salaires conservent les positions atteintes, tandis que les 
prix commencent déjà à baisser; 4) finalement, au terme de cette phase décroissante, les 
salaires et les prix finissent par diminuer simultanément » (Fanno, 1947, p. 164).
De ces considérations découlent des modifications substantielles sur le 
niveau de la consommation 5 et des profits, et, par conséquent, le processus 
cumulatif même qui régit l’ensemble du système se trouve altéré.
A travers l’analyse de Fanno sur la dynamique des prix, on peut saisir 
la pensée dominante de l’époque, où le rôle de l’inflation due aux salaires 
apparaît modeste. Par ailleurs, c’est le déclenchement de la guerre de Corée, 
au début des années 50, qui impose l’importance de la dynamique inflation- 
nelle due aux coûts, avec toutes ses variantes les plus significatives qui 
prennent peu à peu une consistance spécifique, en fonction de l’impact 
qu’elles exercent sur la réalité économique.
3. Fluctuations économiques et croissance
Les fluctuations caractérisent les processus de croissance, mais, contrai­
rement aux études de Marx et de Schumpeter, la plupart des traités économi­
ques étudient séparément les deux phénomènes. Le motif fondamental de 
cette dissociation entre cycle et trend doit eîre attribué en bonne part aux 
difficultés d’analyse, variables selon le type d’approche adoptée, que révèle 
le fait d’aborder conjointement une telle problématique. En effet, les mouve­
ments de croissance ont une vitesse relativement faible, mais ils suivent le 
même cours et acquièrent du relief sur une longue durée; tandis que les 
mouvements qui marquent les cycles de périodicité, présentent une vitesse 
souvent beaucoup plus élevée, quoique leurs cours révèlent tout aussi rapide­
ment de virtuelles inversions.
5 Fanno (1956, chap. III) analyse dans le cadre d’une économie stationnaire, l’effet d’une 
perturbation una tantum qui frappe les consommations. L’enquête est menée à partir d’une 
activité productive des entreprises calculée en journées de travail, c’est-à-dire fondée sur des 
matières premières et des semi-produits qui, à travers des étapes successives, subissent les 
transformations de rigueur pour devenir des produits à placer sur le marché. Mais ce schéma 
n’est pas suivi dans les chapitres suivants, lesquels sont centrés sur les économies progressives 
où la notion de temps nécessaire à la production est simplement exprimée au moyen d’un lag. 
Cela sous-entend l’adoption implicite d’une seule phase de travail. « Par ailleurs, les théories 
des cycles économiques considèrent le plus souvent le retard et négligent l’analyse temporelle 
du processus de production » (Montesano, 1982, p. 217). Toutefois, on peut relever des 
variations de la vitesse de production telles que se trouve enclenché un comportement 
appréciable dans certaines situations particulières, observables du cycle économique, comme l’a 
souligné avec acuité Montesano (1982).
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Le modèle de Fanno, tout comme celui de Hicks, appartient au groupe 
des modèles combinatoires cyclo-trend. Chez Fanno, la ligne de l’expansion 
potentielle décrit l’évolution de l’économie dans des conditions d’équilibre et 
de totale occupation des facteurs productifs.
Cette ligne est, en somme,
« le lieu géom étrique des positions successives des équilibres walras-parétiens d’un 
systèm e en cours d ’expansion, et donc la ligne où en chaque point, donc tout au long de 
laquelle, les entreprises ne réalisent pas de gains ni ne subissent de pertes » (Fanno, 
1956, p. 44).
Il s’ensuit que,
« l ’investissem ent manquant des stimulants nécessaires, le systèm e économ ique ne peut 
pas suivre concrètem ent ce m ouvem ent » (Cozzi, 1982, p. 228).
Dans ce schéma conceptuel, la ligne de l’expansion séculaire 6 se justifie 
pleinement, puisqu’elle décrit comment se comporte le système économique 
quand les chefs d’entreprise perçoivent un profit satisfaisant, capable à la 
fois de légitimer les décisions passées et de stimuler de nouvelles initiatives. 
En effet, on peut remarquer
« que le profit exerce une fonction fondam entale dans les économ ies capitalistes et à 
quel point les variations en cours, et m ieux encore en perspective, tendent, selon la 
direction présum ée, à accélérer ou à retarder l ’a c tiv ité»  (Fanno, 1947, p. 103; concept 
fondam ental, repris évidem m ent dans l ’édition de 1956, p. 119).
C’est de là que part l’analyse de Fanno sur les rapports prix-profits et 
profits-volume de la production globale (1947, chap. V et chap. VI; en 
particulier le chap. VI dans l’édition de 1956), à tel point que l’Auteur en 
arrive à considérer les variations présumées des profits non pas comme le 
résultat final mais bien comme la cause qui détermine les modifications des 
autres facteurs. Par conséquent, les changements qui interviennent dans le 
niveau des profits
« s ’affirment, en tant qu’objet de prévision, com me un élém ent actif, et non passif, des 
fluctuations » (Fanno, 1947, p. 147).
6 Le warrented path o f growth et le natural path of growth, analysés par H arrod (1948), 
présentent de points de contact avec les lignes de l’expansion potentielle et séculaire, comme 
Fanno lui-même le précise dans l’édition revue et corrigée de son essai (Fanno, 1956, n. 1, p. 
51 et n. 1, pp. 58-59).
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Par ailleurs
« les prévisions sur les variations des profits qui, considérées en elles-m êm es, figurent 
com me des forces m otrices originelles, apparaissent com m e une résultante » (Idem , p. 
149)
des facteurs propulsifs et perturbants, mais, en même temps, elles repré­
sentent
« le m oyen par lequel l ’action mécanique de ces facteurs, se transformant en force 
humaine en action, com munique le m ouvem ent à tout le systèm e » (Idem, p. 149).
Fanno renforce sa pensée dans l’édition suivante de son oeuvre, où il 
affirme que l’introduction du multiplicateur et de l’accélérateur 7
« n’em pêche pas de continuer à considérer les profits, tels qu’ils sont effectivem ent dans 
les économ ies capitalistes, à savoir les élém ents moteurs des m ouvem ents auxquels ces 
dernières sont assujetties » (Fanno, 1956, p. 179).
Se détachant ouvertement de l’analyse de Harrod, Fanno soutient dans 
son taux sur le profit attendu 8 en tant qu’anneau de conjonction, la liaison 
entre les lignes de l’expansion séculaire et potentielle, réalisable à travers la 
fonction d’investissement.
Cette connexion est d’une importance capitale puisque Fanno cherche, 
en posant ainsi le problème, à surmonter les ambiguïtés qui peuvent dériver 
d’une approche basée sur l’action réciproque du multiplicateur et de l’accélé­
rateur, vu que, dans ce dernier cas, c’est précisément en fonction de la 
valeur qu’ils prennent que les coefficients impriment ou non un mouvement 
cyclique à l’activité économique.
Dans le schéma théorique de Fanno, il est de la plus haute importance 
que la prévision soit concentrée sur le cours des profits, ce qui renvoie à 
l’efficacité marginale du capital, étant donné que les prévisions des entrepri­
ses finissent par constituer le pivot où se jouent les décisions qui se répercu­
teront sur les investissements à faire. En effet,
« Les variations des profits présents et futurs, considérées... com m e facteurs déter­
7 En ce qui concerne ce mécanisme, l ’essai de Samuelson (1939) marque une étape 
capitale.
8 Le taux de profit attendu influence directement les décisions relatives aux investisse­
ments primaires et influe aussi, indirectement, sur la réalisation des investissements secondaires 
et tertiaires.
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minant les variations de conjoncture, s’identifient pratiquement avec les variations de 
l’efficacité marginale du capital de Keynes (The General theory o f employment, interest 
and money, London, 1936, p. 316 et sv.). Par conséquent, les deux théories, celle de 
Keynes et la nôtre, se correspondent en substance sur ce point » (Fanno, 1956, p. 355, 
n. 1).
Il en découle que
« la fonction, que l’économie keynésienne attribue à l’efficacité du capital, appartient 
chez Fanno au profit, qui dans les économies progressives sert d ’incitation à investir 
chaque fois que le développement effectif des systèmes, en retard sur le potentiel, offre 
une marge rémunératrice suffisante aux investissements » (Manfredini, 1969, p. 139).
L’interprétation dynamique du processus productif9, qui se concrétise 
dans des augmentations de revenu, ne peut de toute façon pas être dissociée 
de la fonction du chef d’entreprise. En effet, c’est par rapport au développe­
ment que doivent être réalisées de nouveaux biens d’équipement, dont l’exé­
cution dépend strictement des bénéfices obtenus, lesquels font partie par 
ailleurs des estimations des chefs d’entreprise. Il en dérive un rapport étroit 
entre la réalisation virtuelle de profits et le cours de l’activité économique. 
Aussi le raisonnement analytique de Fanno débouche-t-il sur une théorie 
globale de l’expansion des systèmes, offrant également une interprétation 
dynamique de longue période à l’analyse keynésienne.
4. Mouvements conjoncturels et chocs perturbant le système économique
Au cours de ce siècle, l’activité productive des économies capitalistes, 
quoique marquée par d’amples oscillations, traverse dans les années 
1950-1970 une phase d’expansion sans précédent, tant pour la durée que 
pour l’ampleur et la continuité du rythme de croissance productive. Par 
conséquent, les mouvements du cycle résultent mitigés, bien que dans l’inter­
valle entre 1973 et 1975 se dessine une situation tout à fait particulière qui
9 Pour Fanno, un système économique est stationnaire quand sa structure et ses dimen­
sions restent constantes au fur et à mesure que le temps s’écoule, à la différence d’un système 
statique où la structure et les dimensions demeurent inchangées et au système progressif où 
elles tendent à augmenter. Pour l’Auteur, les configurations de l’équilibre général ne peuvent 
pas être utilisées pour l’étude des fluctuations. La Volpe (1952, p. 607), tout en reconnaissant 
que la théorie walras-parétienne néglige des aspects fondamentaux dans l ’explication des 
oscillations, admet sa validité dans les configurations des systèmes. Fanno ne partage pas cet 
avis (1952, p. 533), estimant qu’il s’agit de fluctuations différentes de celles que les systèmes 
économiques enregistrent concrètement.
4 0 6 CRISTINA NARDI SPILLER
se reproduira d’ailleurs au début des années 80. La nouveauté du phénomè­
ne réside dans une conjonction singulière: le ralentissement de la croissance 
et la montée des prix, en présence d’un taux de chômage en hausse 10 *.
Les effets déséquilibrants sur l’état économique peuvent généralement 
être recherchés parmi les fluctuations des investissements, les variations de 
la dépense publique, les modifications de la consommation privée, l’appari­
tion d’impasses d’origine extérieure, dont l’importance est considérable; tout 
ceci influe négativement sur le domaine de la production nationale. Dans ce 
contexte, les mesures de politique monétaire et fiscale qui sont adoptées, 
sont destinées à vanifier ou à modérer la fréquence, l’intensité et la durée 
des perturbations relatives; mais il se peut tout aussi bien quelles paraissent 
elles-mêmes inadaptées et qu’elles exercent par là même une influence négati­
ve non négligeable sur la dépense globale. Aussi, faisant face à une situation 
de stagflation, plus aisément identifiée dans la problématique affrontée ré­
cemment par les économies, les stratégies adoptées peuvent elles-mêmes 
entraîner une forte augmentation du chômage, et agraver les troubles en 
cours du système économique n . Dans une phase de récession ou de stagna­
tion, alors que la capacité productive est en excédent par rapport à la 
demande correspondante, le rôle fondamental des interventions de l’état se 
confirme à condition que le soutien apporté au système, n’engendre pas une 
nouvelle capacité productive et soit en même temps capable de dissiper les 
conditions actuelles d’incertitude, afin de ranimer l’activité économique.
Dans un cadre si complexe, l’on ne saurait se limiter aux seules condi­
tions centrées sur le capital fixe, puisque l’utilisation qu’on en fait apparaît 
souvent retardée, à cause, entre autres, de lags portant sur des investisse­
ments complémentaires ou même concernant la réalisation manquée de struc­
tures de support appropriées.
D’autre part, si les causes qui influent sur l’activité économique sont 
diverses, il n’en est pas moins vrai que les facteurs qui déterminent les 
investissements ne perdent pas leur valeur. Les chocs responsables de l’aug­
mentation ou de la diminution du revenu et de l’emploi, agissent tant sur la 
demande que sur l’offre. De toutes façons, les nouvelles conditions potentiel­
les du système ne peuvent demeurer opérantes si une situation de stabilité
10 C’est ainsi que se dégage la contexture de stagnation économique et d’inflation, ou, 
autrement dit, prend forme la stagflation. L’insolite dynamique inflationniste impose la recher­
che d’une approche théorique adéquate, d’autant plus que cette situation articulée peut débou­
cher sur des états de unempflation et de slumpflation. Cf. à ce sujet l ’analyse de Nardi Spiller 
(1990).
“ Les décisions prises dans le cadre d’une politique de restriction peuvent stimuler, 
comme cela advint au lendemain du premier choc pétrolier, la croissance du taux de chômage.
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n’est pas établie. En effet, ce sont les perspectives favorables qui permettent 
d’estimer la possibilité d’obtenir des marges de profit et donc de stimuler les 
investissements. L’octroi de taux d’intérêt séduisants tout comme les divers 
dégrèvements fiscaux ne peuvent à eux seuls relancer l’activité des entrepri­
ses. Comme l’avaient déjà souligné les Physiocrates et Smith, les mécanis­
mes, opérant dans la société, découlent des comportements adoptés par les 
opérateurs qui recherchent leur propre intérêt. Mais c’est fondamentalement 
l’état de confiance 12 perçu par les chefs d’entreprise, qui est à la base du 
dynamisme du système économique et qui, rendant possible la réalisation 
des investissements, confirme le rôle des animal spirits.
5. Conclusion
Dans l’étude de Fanno, comme d’ailleurs chez Hicks, le système peut 
ne pas atteindre les limites supérieure et inférieure au cours de la fluctua­
tion, pour des phénomènes d’étranglement et à cause de consistantes innova­
tions technologiques qui, même dans une phase de conjoncture négative, 
peuvent stimuler des investissements. Entre les deux limites extrêmes, se 
situe une multitude de situations intermédiaires, toutes caractérisées par une 
particularité bien spécifique.
Il est tout aussi surprenant que regrettable que l’analyse de Fanno soit 
le plus souvent négligée, et que soit ainsi dépréciée l’acuité de son apport 
spéculatif et opérationnel. A travers la relation entre l’expansion séculaire et 
l’expansion potentielle, l’Auteur italien cherche à surmonter les difficultés 
dérivant d’un modèle fondé sur l’interaction du multiplicateur et de l’accélé­
rateur. Par ailleurs, l’on ne saurait nier que la structure de Hicks introduit la 
possibilité d’un développement cyclique, liée aux investissements autono­
mes. Toutefois, l’absence d’explication quant à la croissance temporelle 
d’une telle typologie d’investissements, ne laisse de susciter une certaine 
perplexité. Dans la charpente conceptuelle de Fanno, l’élément crucial, tout 
en faisant appel au cours exogène de la potentialité de croissance, devient le 
substrat aux motivations économiques, en tant que base du processus de 
décision, déterminant la réalisation des investissements.
12 Le climat d’incertitude qui se propage dans une nation, alimenté par la crainte d’une 
dévaluation ou de changements d’ordre politique, peut entraîner des fuites de capitaux. Dans 
notre Pays, la quantité massive de ces exodes, tant dans les années 60 que 70, influe 
lourdement sur l’ensemble de l ’activité économique. Les motivations qui déclenchent ces flux 
« anormaux » de capitaux et les problématiques qui en dérivent font l’objet de la part de 
Fanno (1935) d’une analyse d’une nouveauté absolue.
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D’où l’importance de l’interprétation de l’Auteur italien qui met l’accent 
sur le « gain » virtuel, générateur d’initiatives et, par voie de conséquence, 
d’engagements. Une telle finalité stimule la fonction du crédit, encourage le 
profit et favorise par conséquent la réalisation des investissements. Il est 
donc hors de doute que le profit est le pivot de toute économie progressive: 
il comporte l’accumulation du capital et détermine également la réalisation 
des investissements dans le cycle suivant.
Mais le profit n’est pas un « élément » distinct du cours global de 
l’économie. Il est en effet étroitement lié à d’autres facteurs qui peuvent en 
substance être ramenés aux déterminants de stabilité de l’économie dans son 
ensemble. Il n’est pas facile de parvenir à cette situation ni de s’y maintenir, 
étant donné qu’à l’origine de l’instabilité se situent toutes sortes de causes: le 
gaspillage de ressources humaines et matérielles, le déséquilibre des Finan­
ces, l’absence de parité dans les rapports internationaux, le cours sinueux du 
taux des changes et du taux d’intérêt. Si ces phénomènes, individuellement 
ou conjointement, deviennent pathologiques, ils déclenchent des forces cen­
trifuges qui peuvent occasionner des dérèglements d’importance, difficile­
ment compressibles.
Dans ce décor à multiples facettes, le rôle de l’autorité centrale se 
trouve rehaussé, qui doit être à la fois en mesure de supprimer les obstacles 
qui pèsent sur la demande, et capable de résoudre les problématiques 
structurales relatives au marché des biens et à celui des services. Dans un 
contexte de ce genre, et nous nous référons tout particulièrement à l’exem­
ple italien, toute politique économique doit également veiller à éliminer les 
faiblesses du crédit et du système monétaire. Il est par ailleurs indispensable 
de résoudre la très grave situation du Budget. Ces objectifs devraient susci­
ter des réflexions non seulement sur les actions visant à des fins nationales, 
mais sur les projections réalisables, au même moment, dans le cadre du 
mouvement global du système international. À partir du rétablissement et 
de l’affermissement de conditions plausibles, l’on peut raisonnablement pré­
voir des profits engageants et concrétiser, ainsi, la faisabilité, d’une possible 
expansion.
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FANNO’S M ODEL OF ECONOM IC FLUCTUATIONS: AN INTERPRETA- 
’ TIVE ANALYSIS
The paper analyses Marco Fanno’s theory of economic fluctuations as was 
developed in his La teoria delle fluttuazioni economiche. Owing, may be, to the 
scarce mathematical support, both the first edition (1947) of this work and the 
second one (1956) contain few passages which present some interpretative 
difficulties.
In Fanno, progressive economies are subject to economic fluctuations which 
put in evidence the long-period expansion progress. In stationary economies, 
there are no cyclic movements. Given the hypothetical link between long-term 
expansion (espattsione secolare) and potential expansion (espansione potenziale), 
Fanno overcomes the difficulties concerning the accelerator-multiplier models.
In Fanno’s analysis, we find some points of contact with many other 
authors, e.g. Keynes, Schumpeter, Pigou, Mitchell, Fisher, Robertson and Afta- 
lion. But Fanno’s approach has a specific importance because he stresses the role 
of profit and the problem of time errors (errori di tempo).
Fanno (1947), like Hicks (1952), presents a cycle-trend model; but while 
Hicks emphazises the role of autonomous investments, Fanno discusses all 
types of investments which can yield profits. His reference to the marginal 
efficiency of capital offers a long period dynamic interpretation of Keynesian 
analysis.
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RECENT GROWTH THEORIES: 
AN ASSESSMENT
by
E l e n a  P o d r e c c a  *
1. Introduction
Growth theory has recently entered a period of ferment, following a 
quiescence of almost two decades.
By the early 1970’s the fundamental elements of growth theory were 
an object of general consensus, at least on the western side of the Atlantic. 
On the other side, economists in the post-keynesian tradition were challeng­
ing the mainstream views, but their approach was followed by few, and 
was not so pervasive. Neoclassical theory, by contrast, formed the basis for 
a huge amount of theoretical work, and for empirical applications in growth 
accounting.
The range of issues that growth theory was expected to cope with 
was, however, quite narrow. Questions such as the explanation of persisting 
cross-country differences in per capita income levels and rates of growth, 
of continuing pressure for migration from low to high-income countries, 
and of the connections between population growth and income growth, 
were not addressed at all.
From a practical point of view, and from the point of view of policy 
advice, growth theory had very little to offer. Its concentration on abstract 
formalism, starting with the literature on optimal growth, initially re-ex­
plored by Cass (1965), was producing “Ramseyfications” of the original 
Solow model which were certainly useful for understanding the logic of 
dynamic optimization, but which did not offer interesting new insights. Not 
surprisingly, growth theory was discarded as esoteric by development econo­
mists, involved in a completely separate endeavor aimed at offering concrete
* University of Trieste, Department of Economics and Statistics, Trieste (Italy).
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policy advice that growth theory could not support. Recent contributions to 
growth theory, beginning with the work of Romer (1986) and Lucas 
(1988), are starting to change this state of affairs. The new models, beyond 
their rigorous formalism and impeccable microeconomic foundations, have 
something interesting to say about growth, even if the substantive contribu­
tions have so far been small.
In what follows I will try to summarize some of these recent develop­
ments. The review is not meant to be exhaustive; on the contrary it is fairly 
limited compared to the proliferation of theoretical and empirical articles 
on growth that has been taking place in the past five years. My aim is just 
to single out some representative models and to assess what new insights 
they provide for our understanding of the process of growth.
2. General Methodology
Virtually all recent growth models are different variants of equilibrium 
growth models. They focus on describing the dynamics of equilibrium paths, 
and work out the dynamics of wages and interest rates which would support 
equilibrium paths. The equilibrium concept is in general a complete markets 
competitive equilibrium with or without externalities. In some models 
(Romer, 1990a) imperfect competition, and in particular monopolistic price 
setting is modelled, but their dynamic behavior is identical to the case of 
competitive equilibrium with externalities.
The economy is imagined to be populated by a number of identical 
immortal consumers, who are more realistically replaced by a dynasty in 
models of the overlapping generation variety (Becker et al., 1990; Ehrlich 
and Lui, 1991). This consumer, or his dynasty, is supposed to be solving an 
infinite time utility maximization problem. For this consumer, firms are 
transparent instrumentalities for carrying out intertemporal optimization sub­
ject to initial endowments and technological constraints.
In terms of the technology, most models assume the existence of an 
aggregate production function, which can depend on a subset of the fol­
lowing inputs: services from physical capital, services from labor with a 
minimal level of schooling and training, services from additional human 
capital, and some measure of technology. This production function can 
exhibit constant or increasing returns, and in most models can be thought 
of as the technology available to the representative firm. In models of 
imperfect competition, by contrast, this function embodies elements of the 
technology and market structure relating producers of intermediate and final
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goods. An implicit assumption of all models is that at all dates markets 
clear at correctly anticipated prices.
Of course many of these assumptions are questionable, but this is not 
an issue for this review. The point is rather that of assessing whether these 
models, despite unrealistic assumptions, can depict growth in a useful way.
3. Decificiences of the Standard Neoclassical Model
Having set out the broad working framework of the new growth 
models, I will underline their essential features and conclusions while 
neglecting mathematical details and technicalities.
A good starting point is to analyze some practical deficiencies asso­
ciated with the standard neoclassical model, on which recent theories try to 
improve.
The general properties of the model are very well known, and require 
no detailed recapitulation. Three of its major empirical flaws are the fol­
lowing.
The model predicts that growth of per capita output converges to zero 
in the steady state, unless exogenous technological change is introduced. As 
it is well known (Lucas, 1988), when including in the original model a 
production function of the type Yt =  A f  (Kt, Lt), with the level of technolo­
gy (At) expanding at a fixed exogenous rate, the rates of growth of per 
capita capital, output, and consumption in the steady state become propor­
tional to the given rate of technical change. In this framework, technological 
progress becomes the driving force behind sustained growth, but the fact 
that such an important determinant is taken to be exogenous is quite unsatis­
factory from a theoretical point of view, besides being not useful at all in 
indicating possible policy actions aimed at increasing the long-run growth 
rate of per capita income.
Even setting aside the above observation, another major problem with 
the neoclassical model is its inability to explain the persisting differences in 
per capita income levels and growth rates across countries. Attributing these 
differences to exogenous differences in technology levels or to differences in 
preference parameters implies recognising the inability of economic theory 
to explain them.
Finally, the model predicts resources flows which are not observed. 
As Lucas (1990) points out, it is an implication of the neoclassical model 
that the returns to capital must be many times higher in the developing 
countries, where capital is relatively scarce, than in the developed ones. As
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a consequence most investment should take place in the LDCs, with capital 
flows continuing until the returns to capital are equalized. Differential 
policies and political risk may dampen this effect, yet the implied return 
differentials are too great to be explained by these factors alone.
Even when returns to capital become roughly equal, the model sug­
gests that equalization of wages should also result. This contradicts the wage 
differentials that persist despite the huge migration of skilled and unskilled 
workers from less-developed countries.
Obviously, the assumptions about technology that give rise to these 
predictions must be inappropriate.
Given the empirical difficulties associated with the neoclassical model, 
and its irrelevance for policy prescriptions, a number of new models have 
recently been proposed to endogenize the growth process.
The two basic approaches underlying the new models of endogenous 
growth have been that of removing the fixed factor constraint of the neoclas­
sical model by allowing constant or increasing returns to reproducible fac­
tors, or that of endogenizing technological change by explicitly modelling 
the introduction of new technologies.
4. Increasing Returns Due to Externalities
In standard neoclassical growth models there are constant returns to 
scale, perfect competition, perfect forsight (or rational expectations in non 
deterministic settings) and no externalities. The resulting competitive equi­
librium paths are Pareto optimal. The first prototype of growth model hing­
ing on a market failure was the learning by doing model by Arrow (1962). 
His comparison between market equilibria and social optima was confined 
to steady states. Later, Sheshinsky (1967) examined optimal growth with 
learning-by-doing, but he was rather elusive in characterizing non-steady 
state equilibrium paths and their comparisons with optimal paths.
Recent developments are improving this state of affairs, starting with 
the contributions by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), which are the first 
attempts to attain a better explanation of the process of economic growth 
and of intercountry differences in growth rates. As a by-product these two 
models have developed techniques for the analysis of non steady-state 
equilibrium growth paths that are not Pareto optimal.
Romer’s (1986) model, which builds on the earlier model by Arrow 
(1962), is an equilibrium model of endogenous technological change in
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which long-run growth is driven by the accumulation of knowledge by 
forward-looking profit-maximizing agents.
At each point in time, knowledge is completely embodied in capital 
goods. New knowledge is assumed to be the product of a research technolo­
gy that exhibits decreasing returns. In addition, investment in knowledge 
gives rise to a natural externality: as knowledge cannot be perfectly patent­
ed or kept secret, its creation by one firm is assumed to have a positive 
external effect on the production possibilities of other firms. As a conse­
quence, production of goods as a function of knowledge and other inputs 
exhibits increasing returns in the aggregate: knowledge has an increasing 
marginal product for the whole economy.
Formally, the production function for an individual firm can be seen as
Yit =  F (klt, Kp xit),
where kit and xit are firm-specific inputs and Kt (=  I  kit) is the aggregate
i
level of knowledge, which the individual firm takes as given.
The function is assumed to exhibit constant returns on ki and x, for a 
given K, so that the individual firms can behave competitively; but, in the 
aggregate, when K  can vary, the production function exhibits increasing 
returns to scale. In other words, there is increasing rather than decreasing 
marginal productivity of knowledge from an aggregate point of view.
Under the assumption of zero growth in the labor force, Romer charac­
terizes the equilibrium paths and the steady state solutions for the competi­
tive case, in which intertemporal optimization occurs through private deci­
sions by owner-consumers, and for the social optimum case, in which a 
fully informed, benevolent central planner maximizes through consumption 
choices the individuals’ utility over time. In both cases per capita output 
shows constant, or even increasing, growth in the steady state. Along the 
equilibrium path both the level and the growth rate of per capita income 
will be lower in the competitive case than in the centrally planned optimum. 
Because the private marginal productivity of knowledge falls short of its 
social marginal productivity, the amount of consumption at each point in 
time is too high, and the amount of research is too low in the competitive 
case.
Government intervention in Romer’s model can achieve a higher 
growth rate. The suggested line of intervention would be to choose taxes or 
subsidies so as to equalize the after-subsidy private and social returns to 
knowledge.
In Romer’s model, increasing returns to knowledge could also overturn
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standard results about convergence: capital might flow from countries with 
low per capita incomes and per capita capital stocks to more developed 
countries.
Although these results might be interesting, and even if the model is 
consistent with the possibility of sustained growth, it still does not provide 
a satisfactory explanation for the wide differences in growth rates across 
countries.
A qualitatively different model with increasing returns is that of Lucas 
(1988). Lucas’ model builds on an early model by Uzawa (1965) and allows 
for human capital, as well as physical labor. More precisely, the model 
assumes a unique labor input, H, taken to be the sum of tangible and 
intangible human capital.
This input resembles quite closely physical capital: it is possible to 
increase H by investment, and this implies incurring a cost through devoting 
resources to the training of additional workers.
The model therefore is one with two capital goods, and with two 
sectors where investment can take place. The key sector determining the 
rate of growth is the one which produces new human capital. Crucial is the 
amount of resources devoted to this sector. The other sector produces con­
sumption and capital goods, according to a production function which 
exhibits increasing returns in the aggregate. The external effect in this 
model is associated with human capital spillovers, of the type that would 
arise, say, from indirect training stemming from conversations between 
colleagues and coworkers.
Similarly to the previous model Lucas characterizes equilibrium growth 
paths and steady states for the competitive case and for the socially optimal 
case. In both cases unbounded growth is generated because of the accumula­
tion of human capital. Owing to the presence of the external effect of 
human capital, the competitive equilibrium growth rates are lower than they 
would be in the centrally planned economy, with the inefficiency being 
larger the larger the external effect.
As far as the levels of human capital and per capita income are con­
cerned, the model predicts that an economy which starts from low levels of 
physical and human capital will permanently remain below an initially 
better endowed economy; however, the model is still not consistent with 
large cross country differences in growth rates.
5. Learning by Doing
In the same 1988 article, Lucas develops a two-good elaboration of the
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model which allows more possibilities. Human capital is assumed to be 
specific to the production of a particular good, and is acquired through a 
process of learning by doing. In this set-up, when different goods have 
different potentials for human capital accumulation through learning by 
doing, then a country which, owing to its static comparative advantage, 
specializes in the production of the low human capital potential good will 
experience a lower growth rate of knowledge and per capita income com­
pared to a country specialized in producing goods with high human capital 
potential.
This version of the model is consistent with permanent differences in 
growth rates across countries, but given the fixed set of goods it does not 
allow for within-country changes in growth rates. Obviously this requires 
continuous introduction of new goods, with learning-by-doing potentials 
decreasing as the production of a given good increases.
This idea is extended and formally modelled in the sophisticated model 
of learning by doing by Stockey (1988).
Dynamic effects of international trade in a learning-by-doing model are 
examined by Young (1991). He develops a model of endogenous growth 
generated by learning by doing which, although bounded in each good, 
exhibits spillovers across goods. The model is then used to analyze the 
impact on growth rates, rates of technical progress, and intertemporal con­
sumer welfare of a movement from autarky to free trade of two economies, 
one of which is initially less technically advanced than the other.
With respect to growth rates, the model suggests that free trade will 
raise the rate of income growth of the more developed country and lower 
that of the less developed one. Intertemporal consumer welfare in the LDC 
is not necessarily reduced, but the final effect is ambiguous.
The results of the model are, indeed, rather weak. In particular, the 
effects of international trade on research and development, on the acquisi­
tion of human capital, and international spillovers of knowledge are not 
considered, although these effects could create quite different results.
6. Research and Development
A different class of models concentrates on the effects of research 
and development on the rate of technological progress and growth. Two 
examples are the contributions by Romer (1990a) and by Grossman and 
Helpman (1991).
In Research-and-Development (R&D) models, endogenous growth is
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generated by the development of new varieties of intermediate or final 
goods (or of old goods with new processes), which is in turn made possible 
by the output of a research and development sector.
In particular R&D generates two kinds of output: the first type is 
product-specific information which enables a firm, which possibly acquires 
a patent for the new design, to produce a new capital or consumption good. 
The second type of output is intangible in nature and comprises more 
general technical information and knowledge which, by its very nature, 
becomes publicly available. This intangible knowledge is intrinsically non 
rival, consisting of ideas which, once produced, can be used at no cost by 
any agent.
Spillovers of knowledge introduce non convexities, and price-taking 
competition cannot be supported. The crucial endogenous variable for 
growth is the amount of resources (human capital) devoted to the R&D 
sector, but in general the market will not provide a socially optimal allo­
cation.
In the absence of interventions, the resources allocated to the sector of 
Jeas may be too low and innovation, and therefore the growth rate, may be 
suboptimally slow in the market equilibrium.
Grossman and Helpman’s model of R&D also examines a number of 
channels through which international trade might affect the long run rate of 
innovation and growth. Their first observation is that the growth rate will in 
general be faster when technical knowledge flows readily across countries 
compared to a situation where all such knowledge has to be produced 
locally. Trade therefore may positively affect growth by facilitating the 
exchange of information and knowledge diffusion during the arrangement of 
commercial transactions. Trade will also induce competition in the innova­
tion process, and reduce duplication of research effort, thereby increasing 
the aggregate productivity in the sector of ideas.
There are cases in which trade will lower the incentives for research, 
so that a country’s rate of growth may be lower in the trade equilibrium 
than in autarky.
International competition with a technologically advanced country 
may lead to a slowing of innovation and growth in a country which starts 
with a disadvantage in research productivity; a country which is well 
endowed with unskilled labor may be led by its comparative advantages to 
specialize in traditional manufacturing, devoting fewer and fewer resources 
to advances in knowledge, with a resulting drop in the overall growth rate.
Even if free trade could slow down a country’s growth rate, however,
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the intertemporal utility of consumers will not necessarily worsen. The 
results are quite similar to those of Young (1991).
7. Human Capital, Fertility Choices and Economic Growth
All the models summarized up to this point concentrate on identifying 
potential engines of growth and on specifying their mechanics in a simpli­
fied framework in which the representative decision-makers are assumed to 
be infinitely lived. Another group of recent models has abandoned this 
simplifying assumption, and has focused on the specific motivating factors 
which link successive generations and may play a critical role in determining 
the pace of growth as well as its dynamics. These models concentrate on 
endogenous links between human capital, fertility, and economic growth.
An example is the model by Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990). 
Human capital, or knowledge embodied in people, is the underlying engine 
of growth in this model, and parental altruism is identified as the factor 
that motivates agents to allocate sufficient resources to promote in their 
successors a stock of human capital which is higher than their own. The 
model adopts a dynastic utility maximization rule in which altruistic parents 
maximize the aggregate utility of their dynasty, but not necessarily the 
individual utility of each of their descendants. A further assumption is that 
the rates of return on human capital are increasing in the stock of human 
capital, at least up to a certain point. The justification provided for this 
assumption is that the educational sector, as well as other sectors which 
produce human capital use educated and skilled inputs more intensively 
than sectors which produce consumption or capital goods.
When human capital is scarce, rates of return on human capital are 
low relative to rates of return on children, and the opposite holds when 
human capital is abundant. As a result societies with little human capital 
will choose large families and invest little in each child, while societies with 
abundant human capital will do the opposite.
This leads to the existence of two possible stable steady states: one 
characterized by large families, little human capital, and slow growth, where 
the economy is stuck in a poverty trap, and one with small families, high 
human capital, and growing per capita output.
A more elaborate model of human capital fertility and growth is pro­
vided by Ehrlich and Lui (1991), who identify the motivating forces behind 
parents’ investment in their children in mutual emotional and material de­
pendence.
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Parents enjoy direct utility from the children’s behavior through mu­
tual love and respect, and when they reach old age they become dependent 
on their children for material support. Children depend on their parents for 
their material needs and for the acquisition of productive knowledge. In this 
model implicit self-reinforcing contracts involving intergenerational trade 
determine the process of accumulation of human capital which in turn 
induces growth.
Ehrlich and Lui’s model, similarly to the previous model, generates 
two possible steady states: one stagnant equilibrium of zero (or low) growth 
and a self-generating growth equilibrium. Exogenous increases in young-age 
longevity in this model can unambiguously raise the economy’s long-run 
rate of growth. In fact a large increase in longevity would destabilize the 
stagnant equilibrium and drive the economy into f a growth equilibrium 
during which fertility declines continuously.
8. Conclusions
Have these new theories brought significant advances in our understand­
ing of the growth process? From a theoretical and methodological point of 
view they certainly have. They have underlined as the main determinants of 
growth capital accumulation, human capital, learning-by-doing, research and 
development, and innovation. They suggest that markets will not always 
provide an optimal amount of knowledge, and provide scope for policy 
interventions. Most importantly they provide a comprehensive methodologi­
cal framework for the analysis of the growth process.
From a practical point of view, however, the substantive contributions 
have been quite small indeed. Each model emphasizes a different issue, and 
none of them has been properly empirically tested to quantify the import­
ance of each issue. Theoretical and empirical evidence is still too weak to 
rely on these models for any policy advice.
There is a further aspect of this kind of models which strikes one as 
ultimately implausible: the automatic presumption that observed paths are 
full equilibrium paths, and that the equilibrium paths themselves are unaf­
fected by the short-to-medium-run experience.
Basic medium-run questions such as possible price rigidities, financial 
constraints, labor market segmentation, infrastructure, imperfect informa­
tion, income distribution, and economic and institutional organizations have 
been ignored by growth models so far. Yet they are undeniably determinant 
factors influencing each country’s actual growth path.
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Attention, in my opinion, should now turn to these issues. Analytical 
tools have evolved to the point where formal quantitative analysis of these 
aspects will be possible.
REFERENCES
Arrow K., “The Economic Implications of Learning by doing”, Review o f Economic Studies, 
1962, 29, 155-73.
Becker G.S., Murphy K.M., Tamura R., “Human Capital, Fertility and Economic Growth”, 
journal o f  Political Economy, No. 5, 1990, 98, 512-37.
Cass D., “Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumulation”, Review o f E- 
conomic Studies, 1965, 32, 233-40.
Ehrlich I., Lui F.T., “Intergenerational Trade, Longevity and Economic Growth”, Journal of 
Political Economy, No. 5, 1991, 99, 1029-59.
G rossman G.M., H elpman E., Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1991.
Lucas R.E., “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”, Journal o f Monetary Economics, 
1988, 22, 3-42.
-------, “Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?”, American Economic Review,
No. 2, 1990, 80, 92-96.
Romer P.M., “Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth”, Journal o f Political Economy, No. 5, 
1986, 94, 1002-37.
-------, “Capital Accumulation in the Theory of Long Run Growth”, in R.J. Barro, ed., Modern
Business Cycles Theory, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
------- ( 1990a), “Endogenous Technological Change”, Journal o f Political Economy, No. 5, 1990,
98, S71-S102.
------- (1990b), “Are Non Convexities Important for Understandig Growth?”, American Econom­
ic Review, No. 2, 1990, 80, 97-103.
Sheshinsky E., “Optimal Accumulation with Learning by Doing”, in K. Shell, ed., Essays on 
the Theory o f Optimal Growth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967.
Solow R.J., “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal o f 
Economics, 1956, 70, 65-94.
-------, “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function”, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 1957, 39, 312-20.
-------, “Growth Theory, an Exposition”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.
4 2 2 ELENA PODRECCA
Stern N., “The Determinants of Growth”, The Economic Journal, January 1991, 101, 122-33.
Stockey N., “Learning by Doing and the Introduction of New Goods”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 1988, 96, 701-17.
Uzawa H., “Optimum Technical Change in an Aggregative Model of Economic Growth”, 
International Economic Review, January 1965, 6, 18-31.
Young A., “Learning by Doing and the Dynamic Effects of International Trade”, N.B.E.R. 
Working Paper N. 3577, 1991.
NOTA SULLE RECENTI TEORIE DELLA CRESCITA
Questo articolo esamina alcuni recenti contributi alla teoria della crescita. 
La rassegna non intende essere esaustiva; il suo scopo è piuttosto quello di indi­
viduare alcuni modelli rappresentativi e valutare il loro contributo alla compren­
sione del processo di crescita economica. Dopo una breve introduzione ed una 
descrizione della metodologia generale vengono presi in esame modelli di cresci­
ta endogena basati rispettivamente su rendimenti crescenti, learning by doing, 
ricerca e sviluppo, capitale umano e scelte di fertilità. Per ciascun modello sono 
evidenziate le caratteristiche essenziali e le conclusioni, trascurando i dettagli 
matematici e i tecnicismi.
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SPECULATION AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY: 
DOES THE DEGREE OF PRICE FLEXIBILITY MATTER?
by
H u i -K u a n  T s e n g  *
1. Introduction
Whether private speculation in forward exchange stabilize or destabi­
lize exchange-rate movements has become the focus of recent work, such as 
Driskill and McCafferty (1982), Kawai (1984), Eaton and Turnovsky 
(1984), among others. The recent focus was seemingly motivated by two 
events. One is the large fluctuation of exchange rates that have been featur­
ing the floating-rate system since 1973. This disappointing development 
calls into question the role of rational profit-taking speculation in foreign 
exchange markets.
Another refers to the empirical failure of the forward exchange rate to 
be an unbiased estimator of the future spot rate (e.g. Geweke and Feige, 
1979; Frankel, 1980; Hansen and Hodrick, 1980 and others). Such empiri­
cal evidence implies that, even in the long run, speculators may profit by 
taking an open position in the forward exchange market \  A risk premium — 
the discrepancy between the forward rate and the future spot rate — then 
serves as a reward to speculators that are willing to assume exchange risk. 
International commodity traders and interest arbitragers can therefore be 
insured from exchange risk by “paying” a market-determined risk premium 
to speculators 2.
Has the response of private speculators to the market-determined risk 
premium deteriorated exchange rate variability? The answer was mixed in
* Department of Economics, University of North Carolina at Charlotte.
1 An open position refers to the situation in which the value of speculators’ assets are subject 
to exchange rate movements.
2 In fact, commodity traders and interest arbitragers do not directly pay a risk premium to 
speculators. The interaction among the three agents will be spelled out later in Section 2.
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the literature, depending on the origin of shocks that perturbed the economy 
concerned (e.g. Eaton and Turnovsky, 1984).
Recent analysis of forward market speculation, however, all built on 
the two critical assumptions that both purchasing power parity (PPP) and 
covered interest parity (CIP) held continuously over time 3. Namely, in 
recent works, domestic and foreign goods are homogeneous and their prices 
are perfectly flexible, on the one hand, and domestic and foreign bonds are 
perfect substitutes on a covered basis, on the other hand.
True, the two assumptions much simplify theoretical analysis. But, 
they rule out the likelihood that private speculation may have opposite 
effects on exchange-rate variability corresponding to various degrees of price 
flexibility and/or mobility (i.e. asset substitutability). Such concern is of 
importance, not only in its own right, but to the failure of PPP and CIP to 
gain empirical support (e.g. Cumby and Obstfeld, 1981; and Dornbusch, 
1985).
The aim of this paper is to address the aforementioned issue for a 
small, open economy. Specifically, this paper studies whether or not increased 
speculation in forward exchange may reduce exchange-rate volatility (as 
measured by the one-period variance of the spot exchange rate), taking 
into account various degrees of price flexibility and capital mobility. Two 
random shocks are assumed to impinge on the economy in a stochastic 
macroeconomic model. One is a real shock originating in the domestic 
goods market, and the other is a nominal shock originating in the domestic 
money market. To bring this study into the focus, all foreign shocks are 
ignored in this paper.
Extension often brings about structural complexities, however. Analyti­
cal treatment becomes intractable because the PPP and CIP hypotheses are 
relaxed. This study, therefore, resorts to numerical simulation.
The major findings of this study are summarized as follows. First, 
insofar as exchange-rate volatility is concerned, the role of forward market 
speculation appears insensitive to the degree of capital mobility, whether the 
shock is real or monetary. But, this is not the case when the domestic 
monetary shock perturbs the economy. For example, as indicated by simula­
tion, increased speculation tends to be stabilizing the spot exchange rate 
against the monetary shock when the price of goods is sufficiently flexible, 
while causing greater fluctuations of it when the price is rather sticky. The
3 Earlier models of foreign exchange markets, such as Tsiang (1959), Spraos (1959), G rubel 
(1966), Sohmen (1969), and McCormick (1977) among others, are all partial equilibrium models. 
In contrast to more recent models, these models did not treat agents’ expectations rationally.
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finding that links the role of forward market speculation to the degree of 
price flexibility has not yet been noted in the literature 4.
The above results convey a policy implication. Tobin (1978) suggested 
to “put some sand in the wheels of international finance”. His proposed 
scheme was a moderate, world-wide transactions tax on foreign exchange, 
which might discourage both interest arbitrage and forward speculation. 
This study suggests that such tax deterrents to international hot money 
may, or may not, dampen the highly volatile exchange-rate movements 
under the current floating exchange-rate system. Other than the origin of 
shocks, as noted by the recent literature, the degree of price flexibility also 
plays a role in determining whether private speculation is a stabilizing or 
destabilizing element insofar as exchange rate variability is concerned.
Section 2 of this paper outlines the model. Section 3 solves the equilib­
rium spot rate under the rational expectations hypothesis, and computes its 
one-period variance to measure the magnitude of exchange-rate volatility. 
Section 4 conducts numerical simulation including sensitivity analysis, while 
concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2. The Model
The model presented here is based on Tseng (1991) and summarized 
by the following equations 5.
Domestic goods market-.
(1) dt — hlal +  h2Tt hl >  0, b2 >  0
(2) at =  a y  -  a2rt +  uu 1 >  a x >  0, a2 >  0
(3) Tt = T j  +  T{
(4) Ts, ~  P (ej +  p* -  pt) P >  0
(5) T f = S ( e f _ i +  E ^ l [ p X - E t_ 1[pa) S >  0
4 In Dornbusch’s (1976) celebrated work, price stickiness was firstly shown to make ex­
change rates more volatile when an unanticipated monetary shock occurred. This paper takes a 
further step by asking whether rational profit-taking speculation can reduce such volatility in 
different degrees of price stickiness.
5 Tseng (1991) was concerned with the effects on exchange-rate variability of official inter­
vention in the forward exchange market. In contrast, this study focuses on the effects of private 
speculation.
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( 6) pt =  Pt- 1  +  & (dt -  y) <P >  0
Domestic money market'.
(7) m -  pt =  S21y  -  (l/i22) rt +  «2/ >  0, i22 >  0
Foreign exchange markets:
(8) Kt =  [i [e{ -  e\ +  r* -  rt) n >  0
(9) Zt =  t  (E, [<̂  + J  -  eft) r  >  0
(10) Th + j +  Kt =  Zt
(11) Tj +  Zt_ j =  Kt 
Foreign variables:
(12) Pt = P
(13) r] =  r
where all variables except letters, r and r are measured in logarithms; the 
subscript t denotes period t and Et [ • ] is an expectation operator based on 















— domestic real aggregate demand 
=  domestic real absorption
=  real aggregate trade balance 
=  real spot trade balance 
=  real nonspot (hedged) trade balance 
=  domestic output level (which is assumed to be fixed)
=  domestic nominal rate of interest
=  the spot exchange rate (measured in terms of units of domestic 
currency per unit of foreign currency)
=  expectations of X  in period t +  1 conditional on information 
available in period t, where X  =  p, es, p*
— the forward exchange rate (measured in terms of units of 
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency)
=  domestic goods price 
=  domestic nominal money supply
=  the arbitragers’ real stock demand for foreign exchange
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Z =  the quantity of forward contracts purchased by private specula­
tors
p * =  foreign price level; p* =  long-run stationary level of p*
r* =  foreign nominal rate of interest; r* — long-run stationary level
of r
uy — random disturbance in domestic absorption
«2 , =  random disturbance in excess supply of domestic nominal
money
The domestic goods market is characterized by equations (l)-(6). Equa­
tion (1) is a log-linearized aggregate demand function. Domestic aggregate 
demand (dt) is composed of the real domestic absorption (a,) and the real 
trade balance (Tt) in period t 6.
Equation (2) states that the current real domestic absorption, at, de­
pends positively on the (fixed) real domestic output, y, and negatively on 
the current domestic nominal rate of interest, rt, rather than the real rate of 
interest, for simplicity 7. The current domestic absorption is also subject to 
the stochastic disturbance, uu, which contains random changes in domestic 
fiscal policy or private consumption and investment. Equation (3) is an 
identity with the real trade balance (Tt) equal to the spot trade balance (Tst) 
plus the nonspot trade balance (T{).
The spot trade balance, as indicated by equation (4), depends on the 
current terms of trade, (ej +  p* -  pt). The sign of /? is positive, indicating 
that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds. The nonspot trade balance is 
determined by the expected terms of trade, +  El_l [p*] — Et_ x [pj), 
according to equation (5). Notice that since export and import decisions 
are made by spot traders at the time when they face the current spot rate, 
they are not subject to exchange risk. Nonspot traders, however, face a 
technological lag between the time of making trade commitments and the 
time of receiving (or paying) foreign currency. Since the spot rate at the 
time of actual delivery is uncertain, nonspot traders do confront exchange 
risk. The existence of the forward exchange market provides a tool for 
nonspot traders to hedge against exchange risk. They enter into forward 
contracts in period t — 1, the time of making commitments, to deliver (or 
receive delivery of) specified units of foreign currency in period t, the 
time of actual delivery, in exchange for domestic currency at a stipulated 
forward exchange rate 8.
6 This specification of domestic aggregate demand is based on Bhandari (1983).
7 In fact, this simplicity specification is based on Dornbusch (1976).
8 Hence, for nonspot traders, their expected terms of trade [in eq. (5)] is based on the 
currently known forward rate e[_ | rather than the currently future spot rate E ,_  j [ej].
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Equation (6) stipulates the price adjustment rule, where the positive 
parameter, 0 , represents the speed of price adjustment in response to 
excess demand for domestic goods, (dt — y ) 9. The greater the parameter 0, 
the more flexible will be the price adjustment. As 0  goes to infinity, the 
goods market is continuously cleared along the time horizon. Equilibrium in 
the domestic money market is characterized by equation (7), in which the 
stock level of domestic nominal money supply is assumed to be fixed, and 
the domestic real money demand, subject to the random disturbance u2l, is 
associated positively with the (fixed) domestic real income, y, and negatively 
with the domestic nominal rate of interest, r. This disturbance u2t can be 
taken as random changes in monetary policy or private money demand.
Equations (8)-( 12) specify the operation of the spot and forward 
exchange markets. Equation (8) shows that the desired stock holding 
of spot foreign exchange, Kt, is determined by fhe covered interest-rate 
differential (e{— est +  r* — rt) and the degree of capital mobility [i (or called 
the degree of asset substitutability). Here it is assumed that all spot foreign- 
exchange transactions due to interest arbitrage, Kt, are perfectly hedged in 
the forward market. Hence, Kt represents both a current-period excess de­
mand for spot exchange and a current-period excess stock supply of forward 
foreign exchange.
Equation (9) states the excess stock demand for forward speculation, 
Zt, as being positively associated with private speculators’ anticipated risk 
premium (Et [ej + j] — e{) and the degree of speculative elasticity (t ).
Equation (10) is a market-clearing condition for forward exchange. 
The excess hedging supply ( + , Kt) matches the excess speculation 
demand (Zt). Here, one can clearly see how nonspot traders and interest 
arbitragers shift away exchange risk by selling forward exchange to specu­
lators, who assume the risk by purchasing forward exchange. The forward 
exchange market therefore becomes a place where agents can shift or 
assume exchange risk.
Equation (11) is a market-clearing condition for spot exchange. The 
spot traders generate an excess supply of spot exchange due to the current- 
period spot trade surplus (Tj), and the speculators receive delivery of spot 
exchange as a result of the last period’s forward speculation (¿#_ x). In 
equilibrium, the amount of excess supply of spot exchange (Tst +  Zt_ j) 
equals the covered interest arbitragers’ excess demand for spot exchange 
(Kt). Equations (12) and (13) state that both foreign nominal foreign
9 This price adjustment rule is a modified version of D o r n b u s c h ’s (1976). In contrast to his 
version, the goods price is not predetermined in this model.
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price, p*, and foreign nominal rate of interest, r*t , are exogenous and exhibit 
random movements around their long-run stationary equilibrium p* and 
r* respectively.
There are two random disturbances in this model. One is a real shock 
(uf), and the other is a monetary shock (u2). They perturb the system 
through different channels: ux through the domestic goods market and u2 
through the domestic money market. For simplicity, they are assumed to 
be independent of each other with mean Et \uJt + J  =  0 and a bounded 
variance, Vt [uJt + i] <  °° for j  =  1, 2 and i >  1.
3. Derivation of Rational Expectations Equilibria
In this model, there are three endogenous variables — e\, e{, p, — to be 
determined. The first step is to obtain a set of reduced form equations 10. 
Using (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (7) and (12), the domestic-price adjustment 
equation (6) becomes,
(14a) p t =  9xe\ +  02eft_ l +  9ipt_ l -  92EI_ 1 [/>,] +  04ult -  05u2t
where
with
=  ^  >  0 
A
e2 -  ^  >  o
1 A
oA1IIp* o< =  î h >
A
0 -  ^^l«2ß 2 >  0
4 A
A
A — 1 -f" 0^2^ “1” 0^202^2 ^  0
Using (5), (7), (8), (9), (12) and (13), the forward-market clearing condi­
tion (10) can be written as,
( 14b) E t [ej + 1] =  -  f  xe) +  T2e{ -  />, -  r'iE l [pt +  J  -  T3u2t
where
10 For simplicity, m, y, p*, and f*, are set equal to zero.
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A  =  ^  >  0
T
r  =  s  +  ^  +  T >  o
r3 = ^  > o r3 = -  > o
T T
Using (4), (7), (8), (9), (12) and (13), the spot-market clearing condition 
(11) becomes,
(14c) =  V ;  +  W - i  +  ^4«2/
where
> 0  V2 =  I  >  0
A* ju
n  =  - - T >  <  o =  S22 >  0
P
To solve the economic system represented by the reduced-form equa­
tions (14a)-( 14c), one may use a two-step procedure, given the assumed 
Muthian rational expectations (Muth, 1961) n . First, find the solution for 
the expectations variables, El_ l [>,], Et [p, + J ,  Et_1 [est] and Et [est + J  by 
taking expectations of (14a)-(14c) conditional on period n <  ( /— 1), which 
washes out the disturbance variables uit (i — 1, 2), and then solving the 
resultant equations simultaneously. Second, substituting the solution for 
those expectations variables back into (14a)-( 14c) yields a system of second- 
order equations, which can be solved to obtain 1 2:
e j =  I  [Mn X XUujit. k) + M j2 I  Xk2 (ujit_k)
(15) +  [N l * l o /ll K ^ - i ) +  N2J oA|(«2,<̂ _ 1)]
+ i f m + B A + « )
where M’s, N ’s and B’s are the coefficients subject to the structural equa­
tions (1)-(14), oj (■) is a linear combination of Et \pt + J  and Et [<?) + J ,  Us 
are the characteristic roots, and P (L) is a second-order function of the lag 
operator. Note that 2, and X2 can be solved by setting P (1/A) =  0. Since
11 The detailed procedure with the stability analysis is available from the author upon re­
quest, or see E a t o n  and T u r n o v sk y  (1984) for a similar solution technique.
Since the distribution of p , and e[ are irrelevant to subsequent analysis on spot-rate variabi­
lity, they are omitted.
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both Aj and A2 are shown to be less than unity, the economic system is 
stable, given bubble-free expectations 13.
4. Numerical Simulation
For the purpose of exposition, this paper assumes that variance of 
each random disturbance ujt +1 conditional on all currently available infor­
mation is equal to unity, i.e., Vt \ult + ,] =  V, [u2t + ,] =  1, and that the 
two random disturbances do not jointly impinge on the economy. Using 
equation (15), the degree of exchange-rate volatility due to disturbance j  
is measured by the one-period conditional variance of ej + t 14:
(16) V\ Wt + 1] =  +  M% +  2MjlMj2
Because of structural complexities implied in equation (16), it is impos­
sible to analytically treat the effects of forward speculation on the degree of 
spot-rate volatility. Hence, this study adopts numerical simulation.
4.1. Choice of Parameter Values. -  A set of parameter values is given in 
Table 1. The choice of each parameter value is discussed below.
First, the share of domestic absorption in aggregate demand, hv is 
arbitrarily set equal to 0.90 15. This implies that the linearization constant b2 
is determined to be 0.10 16.
Second, the parameter, a2, measures the interest-rate semi-elasticity of 
domestic absorption. Given an assumed elasticity of 0.01 and a quarterly 
interest yield of 3.33% (Note that the horizon of the models is assumed to 
extend over one quarter), the semi-elasticity, a2, is around 0.30 17.
Third, most empirical estimates indicate that the interest-rate elasticity 
of real money demand is around 0.02. It thus turns out that the interest-rate 
semi-elasticity, l/i22, is .6667 or i22 =  1.5 approximately 18.
13 By bubble-free expectations, we mean that the expectations variables, such as &>,(•) of 
equation (15), will not be explosive over time.
14 Hence, equation ( 16) is a better measure of short-run, rather than long-run, variability of 
the spot rate.
15 This assumed value is more or less consistent with empirical evidence of U.S. and Japan, 
though.
16 Note that equation (1) is a log-linearized aggregate demand function.
17 _  ¿loga _  ¿loga ¿logr _  ¿loga 1̂ _  .01 __ ^
dr ¿logr dr ¿logr r .033
18 The derivation is similar to the above.
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PARAMETER VALUES
T a b l e  1
Remark: the values of a l and i2i are irrelevant because their associated variable y  is set equal 
to zero; see equations (2) and (7).
Fourth, while there has not been sufficient empirical evidence, it is 
assumed that the semi-elasticity of spot trade balance with respect to the 
current terms of trade, P, is le^s than that of non-spot trade balance with 
respect to the expected terms of trade, S, (i.e. 5 >  /?). This assumption 
seems plausible since it is technologically more difficult for an immediate 
response of the spot trade to a change in the terms of trade in the real 
world. Considering some empirical estimates (e.g. Goldstein, 1980), the 
parameter /? is set equal to .10, and the parameter S equal to 0.50.
Finally, without reliable empirical evidence, the speculation elasticity, 
t , is allowed to range from 0 to 200. With the same consideration, the 
degree of price flexibility, 0 , is allowed to range from .001 to 10 and the 
degree of capital mobility, fi, from 1 to 200. Notice that the degree of price 
flexibility refers to the elasticity of the domestic price with respect to the 
current excess demand for domestic goods. So the chosen parameter values 
of 0  consist of those that are inelastic (0  <  1), unit elastic (0  =  1) or 
elastic (0  >  1).
Given the base parameter set, the first part of the numerical simulation 
is conducted by allowing the speculation elasticity r  to change from 0 to 
200. Using the assumed parameter values, the author of this paper wrote a 
FORTRAN program (which is available upon request) to calculate the 
degree of spot-rate variability (eq. (17)) for each given value of the specula­
tion elasticity (r). The second part is sensitivity analysis, where given other
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parameters held constant, the degree of spot-rate variability is calculated for 
each possible combination of <P and [i.
4.2. Results under the Base Parameter Set. — Table 2 reports the degree of 
spot-rate volatility corresponding to different degrees of the speculation 
elasticity (r) under the base parameter set, when the domestic absorption or 
monetary disturbance perturbs the economy. One common feature stands 
out of the table. Increased speculation (i.e. the increase in t ) unambiguously 
augments the variance of the spot rate, whether u1 or u2 is present. It 
suggests that private speculation (in response to a risk premium) tends to 
destabilize the spot rate against each shock.
Table 2
VARIANCE OF SPOT RATES UNDER THE BASE PARAMETER SET








Another result from Table 2 also deserves attention. The speculation 
elasticity ( t ) ranges from 1 to 200. Over such a wide range, each variance of 
the spot rate turns out to be far below unity in the presence of the domestic 
absorption disturbance (wj), while exceeding unity in the presence of the 
domestic monetary disturbance (u2). With Var (ux) and Var (u2) being fixed 
at unity, these results imply that, compared with the shock’s own fluctua­
tion, a monetary shock tends to cause a greater exchange-rate fluctuation 
and a real shock to bring a smaller one.
Of course, the findings above are merely tentative. As mentioned ear­
lier, there remains lack of reliable empirical evidence on the degree of price 
flexibility (<P) and the degree of capital mobility {/x). Hence, it is particular­
ly important to see if the results from the base parameter set are sensitive to 
changes in the two parameters.
4.3. Sensitivity Analysis. -  Table 3 reports the results of sensitivity analysis
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Table 3
VARIANCE OF SPOT RATES UNDER SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS; 
DOMESTIC ABSORPTION SHOCK («j)
ß f i  =  10 ( i  =  60
OO<NII
t/0 .001 .5 5 .001 .5 5 .001 .5 5
1 .1414 .2400 3.5868 .1453 .2466 3.6836 .1459 .2476 3.6974
5 .1658 .2812 4.1910 .1704 .2890 4.3054 .1711 .2901 4.3217
10 .1706 .2893 4.3099 .1754 .2974 4.4278 .1761 .2985 4.4446
30 .1742 .2953 4.3980 .1791 .3036 4.5185 .1798 .3048 4.5357
60 .1751 .2969 4.4212 .1801 .3052 4.5425 .1808 .3064 4.5597
100 .1755 .2976 4.4307 .1804 .3059 4.5522 .1811 .3071 4.5695
200 .1758 .2981 4.4378 .1807 .3064 4.5596 .1815 .3076 4.5769
Remark: each entry of variances under 0  =  .001 has been multiplied by a factor of 105.
when the domestic absorption disturbance is present. It is clear from the 
table that increased speculation is seen to increase the variance of the spot 
rate (in the presence of this real shock) in all cases. That is, the destabilizing 
role of private speculation turns out to be robust to the degree of both 
capital mobility and price flexibility.
In contrast, this may not be the case in the presence of the domestic 
monetary disturbance (u2). As indicated by Table 4, regardless of the degree 
of capital mobility (p.), increased speculation is seen to increase the variance
Table 4
VARIANCE OF SPOT RATES UNDER SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS; 
DOMESTIC MONETARY SHOCK (a2)
ß H =  10 p =  60 H =  200
r / 0 .001 .5 5 .001 .5 5 .001 .5 5
1 1.9394 1.3575 .2617 1.9698 1.3754 .2605 1.9741 1.3780 .2604
5 2.1266 1.4681 .2544 2.1615 1.4895 .2532 2.1664 1.4915 .2530
10 2.1629 1.4894 .2531 2.1986 1.5104 .2518 2.2037 1.5134 .2516
30 2.1896 1.5105 .2521 2.2260 1.5265 .2508 2.2312 1.5295 .2506
60 2.1966 1.5092 .2518 2.2333 1.5307 .2505 2.2385 1.5338 .2504
100 2.1995 1.5019 .2517 2.2362 1.5324 .2504 2.2414 1.5355 .2502
200 2.2017 1.5122 .2516 2.2384 1.5337 .2503 2.2436 1.5368 .2501
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of the spot rate (due to the monetary shock) if the degree of price flexibility 
(0) equals .001 or .5, while decreasing the same variance if the degree of 
price flexibility equals 5. That is, whether or not speculation can stabilize 
spot-rate movements against the monetary shock is irrelevant to the degree 
of capital mobility, but dependent upon the degree of price flexibility. 
When price adjustments for disequilibrium in the goods market are sufficient­
ly elastic (0  =  5), increased speculation helps reduce spot-rate volatility. 
Rather, when such price adjustments are sufficiently inelastic (0  =  0.001 
or .5), increased speculation is destabilizing. Thus, price flexibility becomes 
a key factor in determining the role of private speculation.
Unlike the degree of capital mobility, the degree of price flexibility 
also determines whether the real or monetary shock can induce a degree of 
spot-rate volatility that exceeds the degree of the shock’s own fluctuation. 
For example, as shown by Table 3, with the degree of price flexibility being 
as high as 5, the real shock results in an excessive fluctuation of the spot 
rate (i.e. Var (es) >  1). To the contrary, with the degree of price flexibility 
being as low as .001 or .5, the monetary shock provokes a similarly exces­
sive fluctuation of the spot rate. This asymmetric result modifies the preced­
ing finding of Section 4.2, where the domestic real shock (zq) fails to induce 
a high degree of spot-rate volatility relative to the degree of the shock’s own 
instability.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the effects of forward market speculation on spot- 
rate volatility in a stochastic macroeconomic model for a small economy. It 
abandons the hypotheses of PPP and CIP, which were often imposed in 
the literature. This extension generates structural complexities, and thus 
numerical simulation is employed. The paper obtains the two major results:
First, when the domestic real (absorption) shock perturbs the econo­
my, increased speculation in forward exchange tends to deteriorate fluctua­
tions of the spot rate. Further, this destabilizing effect is found to be robust 
to various degrees of price flexibility and capital mobility.
Second, when the domestic monetary shock brings perturbation into 
the economy, increased speculation in forward exchange may not necessarily 
augment the degree of spot-rate volatility, crucially depending on the degree 
of price flexibility. It is found that increased speculation may be s t a b i l i z in g 
when the domestic price is sufficiently flexible. The degree of capital mobili­
ty appears irrelevant in this regard.
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The paper suggests no room for private speculation to play a stabilizing 
role against unanticipated real shocks, insofar as exchange-rate variability is 
concerned. Of course, this point is merely suggestive, instead of conclusive, 
due to the limitation of any simulation approach.
This paper requires further extension in the future. First of all, the 
economy’s output should be allowed to deviate from its full-employment 
level in the short run. In so doing, it would be important to distinguish 
between short-term and long-term fluctuations of exchange rates. This paper 
ignores the latter.
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SPECULAZIONE E VOLATILITÀ DEI CAMBI: È IMPORTANTE IL 
GRADO DI FLESSIBILITÀ DEI PREZZI?
Questo articolo esamina se la speculazione privata nei cambi a termine può 
destabilizzare i movimenti dei cambi in un modello macroeconomico stocastico. 
La simulazione numerica suggerisce che sotto questo aspetto il grado di flessibi­
lità dei prezzi è un fattore importante. L’implicazione di politica economica è 
che non è affatto certo che una politica fiscale volta a scoraggiare i movimenti 
a breve di capitali internazionali stabilizzi i cambi. Come si rileva nella lettera­
tura, oltre all’origine degli shock è importante nella speculazione il grado di 
flessibilità dei prezzi.
■
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PORTFOLIO BALANCE AND DYNAMIC STABILITY 
UNDER DUAL FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES
by
Ching-Chong Lai and W en-Ya Chang * *
1. Introduction
It is widely recognized that the dual exchange rate regime has been 
one of the mechanisms utilized in many countries to relieve pressure on 
official reserves caused by massive shifts in speculative capital movements. 
According to 1988 IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions, more than one-sixth of the member countries have 
engaged in dual currency practice. Under such a system, the current and 
the capital account are separated in that each is required to form its own 
market. The price in the current account market is usually called the 
commercial rate, and that in the capital account market is called the financial 
rate. Some countries fix the former while let the latter float; others let both 
float freely.
The existing studies of dual exchange markets almost unanimously 
focus their attention on the case of a one-fix-one-floating rate (see for 
example Flood, 1978; Cumby, 1984; Gardner, 1984; Dornbusch, 1986; 
and Lai and Chang, 1987, 1990a). It seems that very few efforts have been 
made in the literature to analyze the case of a dual floating exchange rate. 
Although Flood and Marion (1982), Bhandari (1985), Lai and Chu (1986), 
and Lai and Chang (1990b) have focused on the operation of a dual floating 
exchange rate system, all of these studies have missed the following point. 
Ascertaining whether a country is in a net creditor or is in a debtor position
* Sun Yat-Sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, Nankang, 
Taipei (Taiwan).
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plays an important role in determining the dynamic properties of the econo­
my. Thus, this note attempts to examine the relationship between the dynam­
ic stability and the residents’ net foreign asset position in the context of a 
dual floating exchange regime. The analysis indicates that the system will 
definitely exhibit total instability if the domestic country is a net foreign 
creditor, while it may be totally stable or totally unstable if the domestic 
country is a net foreign debtor.
2. The Model
The framework we shall use is a portfolio balance model developed by 
Kouri (1976) and Branson (1979) for a flexible exchange rate, and Gardner 
(1984) and Lai and Chang (1987) for a dual exchange rate. As in their 
system, the analysis is based on a number of simplifying assumptions: (1) 
domestic output is fixed at the full-employment level; (2) the world econo­
my only produces a single traded good, the world price of which is given by 
the foreign economy because the domestic economy is small; and without 
loss of generality, this foreign currency price of the traded good is set at 
unity, meaning the domestic price level is equal to the commercial exchange 
rate as required by commodity arbitrage; (3) there are two assets held by 
domestic residents: domestic money and foreign bonds, and these assets are 
gross substitutes; (4) market participants form their expectations with per­
fect foresight; (5) the net supply of foreign bonds could be positive or 
negative as the domestic country is a net foreign creditor or debtor; (6) 
there is no investment and government purchase of traded goods.
In accordance with the above descriptions of the economy, the model 
of dual floating exchange rates can be expressed as follows:
M/p =  k {pi*/e +  e/e, M/p +  eF/p), kx <  0, 0 <  k2 <  1 (1)
y -  c O' +  i*F> M/p +  eF/p) +  i*F =  0, 0 <  cx <  1, c2 >  0 (2)
where M =  nominal money supply, p =  domestic price level, k =  real 
money demand, i =  foreign interest rate, e =  financial exchange rate 
(defined as the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency), 
F =  domestic net private holdings of foreign bonds (denominated in 
foreign currency), y  =  full-employment output, c =  domestic consumption 
demand, and an overdot indicates the rate of change with respect to time.
Equation (1) is the domestic money market equilibrium condition. 
The demand for real balance is specified in equation (1) as a decreasing
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function of the relative return between foreign bonds and domestic money, 
pi /e +  e/e (see Lai and Chang, 1990b), and an increasing function of 
domestic real wealth. Due to the Walras law in the asset markets, one of the 
equilibrium conditions of two assets is redundant, therefore we do not 
explicitly specify the equilibrium condition for foreign bonds. Equation (2) 
is the equilibrium condition for the current account component of the for­
eign exchange markets. It states that the sum of the trade balance (y -  c) 
and the service account (i*F) must equal zero due to the fact that the 
commercial exchange rate is completely flexible to clear this market. Finally, 
one point which should be pointed out here is that F is unchanged over 
time since the financial exchange rate adjusts freely to clear the foreign 
exchange market for the capital account.
3. Dynamic Stability
We now turn to examine the dynamic properties of the model in the 
neighborhood of the steady state. At the long-run equilibrium, è =  0, equa­
tions (1) and (2) together determine the steady-state value of the financial 
exchange rate, ë, and the commercial exchange rate (domestic price level), 
p. Linearizing the system around the steady-state equilibrium and letting \  
be the eigenvalue associated with the steady state, we have the following 
result:
A =  { î l e  -  ëF/p2kx) \pM/(M +  ëF)] (3)
Obviously, the sign of A crucially depends upon the value of the net 
foreign asset position (E). In what follows we shall focus our attention 
on the precise relationship between the dynamic properties and the value 
of F. Moreover, we assume that the residents’ wealth (M +  eF) is positive 
even if domestic economy is a net foreign debtor (E <  0).
First, if E >  0, from equation (3) it implies that the characteristic root 
A is always greater than zero. Thus we have the following finding.
Finding 1. If the domestic country is in a net foreign creditor position, the 
regime of dual floating exchange rates cannot possibly display a totally stable 
equilibrium.
On the other hand, if E <  0 it follows from equation (3) that
A =  (pi jë  -  ëF/pkf) [M/(M +  ëF)] <  0 as E <  p2Î k f ë 2 (4)
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The above inequality tells us that: (i) the characteristic root may be positive 
if F <  0; (ii) the eigenvalue is associated with negative value unless F is 
sufficiently large in terms of absolute value. We therefore establish the 
following finding.
Finding 2. The system may be characterized with totally unstable equilibrium 
even if the domestic economy is in a net foreign debtor position. Unless the 
domestic residents possess an enormous debt, the domestic economy can be 
associated with total stability.
The economic explanation for the above two findings is as follows. 
Suppose the domestic country is a net foreign creditor and the domestic econ­
omy is at its steady state initially. Let us now investigate the effects of a 
small displacement of e from its steady-state value e in the upward direction. 
For the purpose of restoring current account equilibrium, it can be shown 
that p  has to rise but in a less proportional way than e does (i.e., e/p has to 
increase). The increase in p and e/p will result in an excess demand for 
money, and e >  0 is required to discourage people to hold domestic 
money. This indicates that a small displacement of e from its equilibrium 
level e in the upward direction will result in a further deviation from e. We 
therefore conclude that the system is unstable in the neighborhood of the 
steady state.
On the other hand, if domestic residents possess a sufficiently large 
debt, it can be easily inferred that a small increase in e will lead to an 
excess supply of money; accordingly e <  0 is required to bring demand 
and supply back to equilibrium again. Therefore, the system is stable since 
there exists an automatic mechanism to make e return to its steady-state 
value e.
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SALDO DI PORTAFOGLIO E STABILITÀ DINAMICA CON CAMBI FLUT­
TUANTI
Si esamina la relazione tra stabilità dinamica e posizione netta delle attività 
estere dei residenti in un contesto di regime di cambi fluttuanti. L’analisi indica 
che il sistema mostra instabilità totale se il paese in esame è creditore netto 
sull’estero, mentre può essere totalmente stabile o totalmente instabile se il paese 
in esame è debitore netto sull’estero.
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A DYNAMIC MODEL OF EMPLOYMENT 
IN THE GREEK MANUFACTURING
by
N a t a s h a  M ia o u l i  *
1. Introduction
The role of trade unions in wage and employment determination has 
been acknowledged by economists and policymakers alike. Greece is clearly 
not an exception. It is believed that the power of union members to raise 
the wage above reservation levels results mainly from the fact that they are 
not costlessly replaceable; that is, they are insiders in the sense of Lindbeck 
and Snower (1984). It is also known that union membership is not fixed 
over time but responds strongly to changes in past employment (Booth, 
1983). Currently employed workers carry more weight in the wage setting 
process than the unemployed. There is a rich theoretical and empirical 
literature which attempts to use these insider dynamics to explain em­
ployment persistence (Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Kidd and Oswald, 
1987; Alogoskoufis and Manning, 1988; and Nickell and Wadhwani, 
1990). As a result, any employment decrease due to temporary shocks tends 
to perpetuate itself.
The present paper attempts two things. First, it introduces explicit 
dynamics into a monopoly union model. The extension is nontrivial because 
it allows us to specify conditions under which employment can converge to 
its full employment level. Second, it confronts the model with data from the 
Greek manufacturing during the period 1954-1989. This will enable us to 
identify the reasons for high employment persistence in the Greek labour 
market. *I
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Section II presents a monopoly union model, where union membership 
is a weighted average of those employed when wage contracts are signed 
(insiders) and the whole labour force. The main theoretical result is that 
saddlepath convergence to full employment requires that the union cares, 
not only about the insiders, but also about the unemployed. On the contra­
ry, if only insiders matter to wage bargaining, employment displays full 
persistence (hysteresis) with no convergence to full employment. Therefore, 
the power of insiders in the union membership rule is a crucial factor to 
employment dynamics.
In Section III the model is confronted with data from the Greek 
Manufacturing. Combining the empirical findings with the theoretical predic­
tions, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no room left for the 
unemployed workers in wage negotiations. Then,'a high degree of em­
ployment persistence is attributed to the fact that wages are set with a view 
of ensuring jobs mainly to those currently employed, i.e. the insiders. Our 
estimations for the power of insiders are close to those of Blanchard and 
Summers (1986) for other European countries but higher than in Alogoskou- 
fis and Manning (1988).
The policy message is clear. Measures for increasing the power of the 
unemployed can reduce the extremely high degree of employment persist­
ence and hence increase the flexibility and adjustability of employment to 
negative shocks (see also Emerson, 1988; Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; and 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992 for analogous policy recipes).
Finally, Section IV closes the paper and discusses possible extensions.
II. The Theoretical Model
We keep the theoretical model as simple as possible. In a monopoly 
union context, the labour market consists of a representative firm and a 
trade union. The market operates at discrete and similar periods. Each time 
t, nominal wages (wt) are chosen by the trade union, before the realization 
of the exogenous price level (pt) becomes known. Then, employment {(t) is 
ex-post chosen by perfectly competitive firms.
Consider the formal scenario. Under complete current information, the 
demand for labour is given by 1
i t =  - S { w t - p t) (1) *
Since we want to focus on membership dynamics, we abstract the adjustment costs from 
the point of view of firms.
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where, S >  1 by the properties of a decreasing returns to scale technology. 
All variables will be in logs.
The exogenous price level is assumed to follow a random walk 2
P t = P t - i  +  ut W
where, ut is a white noise disturbance with the standard properties.
Each period t, union members [mt) choose nominal wages (wt) so as to 
keep their jobs from period t onwards (see Oswald, 1986; and Kidd and 
Oswald, 1987)3
m inEt + i \ r*'[ 1 / 2  ( i t + i -  + (3 )
where, 0 <  y <  1 is a nonstochastic discount factor 4. Et denotes rational 
expectations conditional on the available information set at time /, which 
includes all variables up to and including period t — 1 . Thus, current vari­
ables are not observable by union members when they choose wt.
The last step is to define union membership Following Blanchard 
and Summers (1986) and Lindbeck and Snower (1989), we assume that mt 
is a weighted average of those employed when the nominal wage contract is 
signed and of the current whole labour force (pt). Thus, with
0 <  a <  1
mt =  a i t_x +  (1 -  a) pt (4)
In the case where a =  1 , all the unemployed as well as new entrants are 
considered as outsiders 5. In the case where a =  0, everybody is an insider 
and the model is a natural-rate one as in Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977).
The exogenous labour force (pt) is assumed to follow a random walk 
process
2 Assuming other processes would not affect any of our results.
3 W e could assume more complicated objectives for union members (for instance, that 
they dislike price inflation or have a real wage target). However, this would not affect our 
main results. See B l a n c h a r d  and F is c h e r  (1989).
4 Quadratic functions are of particular interest in economic and game theory, first because 
they constitute second-order approximations to other types of non-linear functions and second­
ly because they are analytically tractable admitting in general closed-form equilibrium so­
lutions.
3 A rationale for this membership rule is the assumption that workers remain insiders for 
some time after losing their jobs. The reason unions encourage the unemployed to remain in 
the union appears to be due in part to their desire to increase membership figures, and through 
these, their role in the national union movement.
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Pt =  Pt- 1 +  V, (5)
where v, is a white noise disturbance.
Equations (1 )-(5) complete the structure of the model6. Optimal 
behaviour by union members and the use of (1 ) lead to the following 
Euler equation 7.
ayEt + iet + i + x -  (1 +  a2y )E l + iet + i +  a i t + i_ 1 +  (6 )
+  (1 -  a) (1 -  ay)p l + i_ l =  0
where, the statistical structure and the information set imply Et + i p, + i =  
=  P/ + l-_i and Et + ipt + i =  />, + ,_! for i >  0.
In what follows, I shall examine the dynamic evolution of employment 
given by (6). Starting from the steady state, (6 ) implies that as 
then =  p°°. In other words, in the long-run the whole labour force will 
be employed 8. The next step is to check the evolution of employment 
toward this well-behaved steady state. The rest of the section follows 
Sargent (1987).
Using the lag operator L'it =  6t_it we write (6 ) as 9
a y (  1 _  L±J*lZ l  +  ~ L 2) i t + i + 1 +  (1  -  a)
V «7 7 )
+  (1 -  ay)pl + i_ l =  0 (7)
where [ 1 -  1 +  ^  L +  -  L2)  =  (1 -  XXL) (1 -  A2L) =  1 -  (At +  
l aY 7 J
+  A2) L ~f- A ̂ X̂ L2
We now solve for the two roots in the above factorization (say, 
Aj and A2). Let At =  a and A2 =  1 /ay. In the general case where the 
unemployed workers matter to wage bargaining, i.e. a <  1 , it follows 
that Aj =  a <  1 is the stable root and A2 =  1 /a y  >  1 is the unstable root.
6 It is clear that here we do not examine strategic interactions between the trade union 
and firms as in P l o e g  (1987), or between the trade union and policymakers as in B a r r o  and 
G o r d o n  (1983). Instead, we focus on mechanical dynamics, since the aim is to study the 
(theoretical and empirical) implications of union membership for employment dynamics.
7 This condition is also sufficient if it satisfies the initial and transversality condition (see 
below).
8 This is what one should expect: in the long-run it is optimal for employment to 
“settle-down”.
9 Here, for notational simplicity, we drop the expectations operator.
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Imposing saddlepath stability, we solve the stable root (At) back­
ward 10 and the unstable root (A2) forward. Then, operating on both sides of 
(7) with the forward inverse of (1 — A2L), we get for i >  0 and j  >  0
( 1 aL) 61 + j + j (1 -  a ) (1  -  ay) ~
ay i = o
(ayy + 1 Et + i-\Pt + i +j +
( 8 )
where c is a constant.
We can simplify (8 ) in three ways. First, for i, j  >  0, we have
E, + ,_iP/ + i +j =  Pt + i - 1- Second, since (ay) <  1 , we have 1  (ay) , j =
y = o
ay . . (  i \ 1
=  ------------ . Third, since lim —  =  +  °o, we have to set c =  0
(1 -  ay) <-♦“ {a y )
(together with the use of the unstable root A2 to solve forward, this satisfies 
the transversality condition).
Using all the above and showing that (8 ) holds for i >  — 1 as well, we 
finally get the saddlepath solution for employment
^  + , = + +  (1 — «) Pt + j - i  for i >  0 (9)
where now everything is in terms of observables.
According to (9), employment is a function of once-lagged employment 
and the exogenous labour force. Comparing the final saddlepath solution (9) 
with the membership rule (4), the similarity is striking. This is not surpris­
ing since in our model union members, as defined in (4), can hit their 
employment target exactly conditional on the information set. However, 
the present solution is nontrivial because (9) has excluded the unstable root.
Current employment depends on previous period employment with 
the degree of persistence given by the power of insiders in the union 
membership rule (0 <  a <  1 ). This first-order difference equation implies 
that over time current employment is expected to become less dependent 
on the initial group of those employed (2t_ x) and more dependent on the 
whole labour force until £°° =  p°°.
Observe that in the special case where union members care only 
about those currently employed (a =  1 ), the model does not have well- 
behaved dynamics. In particular, the steady state cannot be defined (any
Since Aj =  a <  1/ V y  the transversality condition is satisfied.
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current employment rate can become the equilibrium or steady state rate) 
and additionally the model is globally unstable (both roots are outside 
the unit circle, =  1 and A2 =  1/y >  1). This is the popular case of full 
persistence of hysteresis in employment: since insiders always set wages to 
protect only their jobs, any level of employment may be self-perpetuating n .
Let us summarize. Rational behaviour by union members can place 
employment on its unique convergent path towards its steady state, which 
is the level of full employment. Such a saddlepath stability is possible if 
there is some room left for the unemployed workers in wage negotiations 
(0 <  a <  1 ).. On the contrary, if only insiders matter to wage bargaining 
(a =  1 ), employment displays full persistence (hysteresis).
The above make clear that the power of insiders in the union member­
ship rule (4) is the crucial factor to employment dynamics. Hence, our next 
task is to identify the value of the parameter a for the Greek labour market. 
This is attempted in the next section, where the Euler condition (6) is 
confronted with data from the Greek Manufacturing.
III. Empirical Results
The empirical work makes use of annual data on employment in the 
Greek Manufacturing during the period 1954-1989, which is the longest 
period available. (The data sources are given in the Appendix).
The choice of this particular sector, i.e. manufacturing, was mainly 
determined for two reasons. First, there are sufficient and relatively reliable 
data which allow a thorough investigation of wages and employment. Sec­
ond, Greek manufacturing is spread among several regions in the country 
and is not as heavily concentrated in a few parts of Greece; it therefore 
characterizes the whole labour market. In other words, the implications for 
employment and wages which emerge from the analysis of the Greek manu­
facturing can be generalized for the whole labour force of the private sector 
without many risks.
I proceed now in the estimation of (6 ). Assuming, without any loss of 
generality, that the exogenous labour force (p) is constant, it can be re­
written as 1
11 See B l a n c h a r d  and Su m m ers  (1986). In the presence of an adverse unanticipated shock 
which reduces employment, some workers become disfranchised. The new smaller group of insid­
ers sets the wage so as to permanently maintain this new lower level of employment causing 
consequently serial correlation to employment. This leads to lower expected employment in all 
subsequent periods even though wages are chosen anew.
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— A)'+ Pl^t-1 +  P2 t̂- 2 +  El (1 0 )
where, £0 is a constant, p, -------------  =  Uj +  X2) and p2 =  -  [  -1  =
ay VrJ
— ~ U iA2). Finally, et is a white noise process justified by the presence of 
expectations in (6 ).
T a b l e  1
















N o t e s : See the Appendix for data definitions, sources and details about estimation and 
testing. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 1 presents the first informal evidence relating to the employ­
ment equation ( 1 0 ). The current level of employment turns out to be 
related to the levels observed over the previous two periods with a degree 
of persistence (pl +  p2) =  0.85. Here (pj +  p2) is a measure of persistence 
in the broad sense of “continuing for a long time into the future”, as in 
Campbell and Mankiw (1987). In other words, the data hint that the 
original series £t is nonstationary.
We can now become more formal by using the standard augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots. This involves rewriting (1 0 ) as
M t -  £0 +  (Pi +  P2 -  1) i t - \ ~  P2A e t - \  +  Et ( I D
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which, gives a regression of A lt =  ( i t — i t_y) on i l__l and A6t_ v
We have seen in the theoretical model above that the two roots are 
Ai =  a and X2 =  1 /ay. We have also proved that if only insiders matter 
to wage bargaining (a =  1 ), the model does not have well-behaved 
employment dynamics. Observe now that if a =  1 , p1 =  1 +  1 /y, 
p2 =  — (1/y) and hence (pl +  p2) =  1. Therefore, the coefficient on 
i t_x in (1 1 ) will allow us to test for employment stability: by testing 
(p 1 +  p2) =  1 , we test the null hypothesis that a =  1 .
Results of the Dickey-Fuller tests for (p1 +  p2) =  1 , are reported in 
Table 2. The relevant /-statistic is 11.331 and hence the hypothesis that
T able  2
TEST FOR AUTOREGRESSIVE UNIT ROOTS IN EMPLOYMENT (g,)
1957-1989
Series DF ADF
C -1 A f t - i
-  0.01 -  0.08 0.60
(0.20) (1.33) (3.92)
N o t e s : MacKinnon critical values: 5 %  level =  -  3 .54 , 1 %  level =  -  4 .25 .
Also, Ag, =  gl - g t_ l /-statistics in parentheses.
a =  1 cannot be rejected at either 5% or 1 % levels. Therefore, the em­
ployment series is integrated of order 1 I (1 ) 12. This finding is consistent 
with the employment patterns of other European countries (see Newell and 
Symons, 1985; Bean, Layard and Nickell, 1986; and Alogoskoufis and 
Manning, 1988).
Let us summarize. Combining the empirical results with the theoretical 
analysis, we cannot reject the hypothesis that a =  1 (results are reported in 
Table 3). In other words, we cannot reject the hypothesis that only insiders 
matter to wage bargaining, which in turn implies that the path of employ­
ment over time is globally unstable.
Employment hysteresis in the Greek manufacturing can be attributed 
to the fact that wages are set with a view of ensuring jobs mainly to those 
currently employed, i.e. the insiders. Outsiders do not seem to play any 
important role and this makes the dynamic process of employment unstable. 
Finally, it is interesting that our estimations for a are close to the estimates
12 I have also checked the hypothesis that ( t is 1 (2) and it is not accepted.
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T able  3
LS ESTIMATES OF EMPLOYMENT EQUATION 1058-1989
Dependent variable (A l,)
c 0.007
(0.004)








N o t e s : See the Appendix for data definitions, sources and details about estimation and 
testing. Standard errors in parentheses.
of Blanchard and Summers (1986) for other European countries but higher 
than those of Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988).
IV. Conclusions and Possible Extensions
This paper has explicitly analyzed the dynamic behaviour of em­
ployment in the Greek manufacturing. The driving force has been an optimiz­
ing trade union whose members change over time. The main theoretical 
result is that employment can converge to its full employment level only if 
union members take into account, not only the interests of the insiders, but 
also the interests of the unemployed. However, confronting the theoretical 
predictions with the data, we cannot reject the hypothesis that only insiders 
matter to wage bargaining. This makes the dynamic process of employment 
unstable.
The policy message is clear and not surprising. Measures for increasing 
the power of the unemployed can reduce the extremely high degree of 
employment persistence and hence increase the flexibility and adjustability 
of employment to negative shocks (see also Emerson, 1988; Bentolila and 
Bertola, 1990; and Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992).
We close with some possible empirical extensions. It would be interest­
ing to introduce capital accumulation and hence interactions between firms
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and union members as in Ploeg (1987), and then test how the presence of 
the capital stock affects employment and wage determination. Another 
possible extension of the model would be to examine the influence of 
stabilization programs and the political business cycle on employment or 
wage determination.
APPENDIX: DATA DEFINITIONS AND DIAGNOSTICS
: the logarithm of manufacturing employment. Source: IFS.
: the coefficient o f determination.
: standard error of the regression.
: the RESET type test for autocorrelation, based on an auxiliary regression of the 
residuals on one lag of the residuals, and on the fitted values. Its asymptotic 
distribution is X 2.
: the RESET type test for departures from linearity, based on an auxiliary 
regression of the residuals on the level and square of fitted values. Its asymptotic 
distribution is X 2.
: the RESET type test for departures from homoskedasticity, based on an auxiliary 
regression of the squared residuals on the fitted values and their squares. Its 
asymptotic distribution is X 2.
A R C H (l): the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity test, based on an auxiliary 
regression of the squared residuals on lagged squared residuals. Its asymptotic 
distribution is X 2.
Basmann : the test for overidentifying restrictions, based on an auxiliary regression of the 
residuals on all the instruments. This is an F-type test.
Chow : the test of the stability of the regression coefficients based on LS estimates of 
two different sample periods. This is an F-type test.
The degrees of freedom for the statistics are in parenthesis. For the statistical theory 
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UN MODELLO DINAMICO DI OCCUPAZIONE PER L’INDUSTRIA MA- 
NUFATTURIERA GRECA
L’articolo usa un modello di sindacato monopolistico con una dinamica 
endogena di associazione per identificare le ragioni dell’alta persistenza dell’occu­
pazione nel mercato del lavoro in Grecia. La stabilità del tipo punto di sella ri­
chiede che il sindacato si preoccupi non soltanto dei lavoratori che sono occupa­
ti al momento (interni) ma di tutta la forza lavoro. Se, al contrario, non si preoc­
cupa degli esterni, la dinamica dell’occupazione non si comporta bene. Combi­
nando le previsioni teoriche con i risultati empirici non possiamo respingere l’ipo­
tesi che l’elevata persistenza dell’occupazione sia dovuta al fatto che gli esterni 
sono esclusi dalla contrattazione salariale.
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 
Volume 40 (1993), N. 5, 457-474
QUARTERLY DISAGGREGATION OF THE 
ANNUALLY KNOWN GREEK GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT 
USING RELATED SERIES
by
D ik a io s  E. T s e r k e z o s  *
1 . Introduction
Empirical analysis of certain countries and historical periods is often 
curtailed by the lack of data sufficiently disaggregated with regard to time. 
By choosing annual data because no quarterly are available, we do not only 
lose efficiency of estimates due to loss of information, but also we are likely 
to have specification errors. This would lead to biases 1 in the parameter 
estimates — biases from what we expect theoretically for parameter change 
due to aggregation over time.
This is the case in Greece where quarterly data for only some basic 
macroeconomic variables are available after the first quarter of 1975. So it is 
impossible to carry out any interesting applied work on quarterly basis 
before that date.
In this paper following a related series “missing” data approach we 
attempt2 to generate quarterly figures of the annually known gross product 
of the industrial sector of the Greek economy in a dynamic quarterly rela­
tionship. Our approach is a missing data technique similar to that of Sargan- 
Drettakis (1974), Gilbert (1977) and Tserkezos (1989a), following an ap­
proach suggested by Anderson (1957). We treat the “missing” quarterly
* Department of Economics, University of Piraeus, Piraeus (Greece).
‘Moriguchi (1970, pp. 427-28).
2 Several methods were devised to deal with the problem of constructing quarterly data 
according to whether (a) related series are available or (b) only annual totals exist. For more, 
see Boot, Feibes and Lisman (1967), Chow and Lin (1971), Friedman (1962), Denton 
(1971), G insburg (1973), Fernadez (1981), Stram and Wei (1986), and more recently 
H arvey (1981b, 1989), and H arvey and P ierce (1984).
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(gross industrial product) observations as unknown parameters which have 
to be estimated simultaneously with the other parameters of a geometric 
distributed lag model (in which the under disaggregation variable is the 
dependent one) taking into account the available annual observations and 
the appropriate 3 functional and stochastic specification between the de­
pendent and the independent variable(s).
Recently an interesting approach to deal with the time disaggregation 
problem is the Kalman Filter approach (Harvey, 1981a, 1981b, 1989; and 
Harvey and Pierce, 1984). The approach we follow in this article is sim pler 
and less computationally expensive than the Kalman Filter approach. In our 
approach, we simply use standard regression packages (TSPRATS, SPSS, 
etc.) after substituting the under disaggregation variable by appropriate 
approximations, for estimating and testin the dynamic model which we 
assumed to explain the behaviour of the under time disaggregation variable.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the under 
estimation specification and the suggested disaggregation technique. In Sec­
tion 3 we give some of the results based on the application of the suggested 
technique trying to generate quarterly figures of the gross product of the 
industrial sector of the Greek economy (QVINDC) for the period 1963.1 - 
1974.IV using as independent variable the quarterly index of industrial 
production (QPRIM). Finally, Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
2 . The Model and the Time-Disaggregation Technique
The missing data technique will be presented through the use of the 
following geometric4 distributed lag model involving the flow variables:
00 4
QVINDCt =  a +  Z bj QPRIMt_ j+  2  (q. +  d} TRt) QtJ +  ut +  ut
t =  1, 2, ..., T. t =  1 , 2 , ..., T. (2 .1 )
with
h = ty ( 2 .2)
Vj =  (1 -  A) 1>, Ivj =  1 0 <  X <  1
3 See Gamaletsos (1973, pp. 267-89).
4 Davidson, H endry, Sbra and Yeo (1978, pp. 669-70). It should be pointed out that at 
the moment in Greece there are not many available time series on a quarterly basis to be used 
as independent variables in the model (2.1).
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QVINDCl =  Quarterly 5 gross product of the industrial sector of the Greek 
economy, at 1970 constant prices
QPRIM =  Quarterly index of industrial production, branches 20-39 
and base 1970 =  100 
Qtj =  Seasonal dummy variables
TRt =  Long-run trend for t =  1, 2, 3, ..., T
ut =  Random disturbance term having the property
ut ~  NID (0, a2).
Using Klein’s suggestion6 to estimate distributed lag models, the 
model (2 .1 ) - (2 .2 ) can be written in matrix form as:
y =  x (A) w +  u (2.3)
with
x (A)' =  [x[ x2 x\ ... x'T) (2.4)
x, =  [ 1  Zt2 Zn Qn Qt2 Qti Qm QnTR, QaTR, Qt)TRt Q M  (2.5)
00
n0 =  E (QVINDCq) =  ( 1 - X ) Z oX Q P R I M (2.6)
(initial-value parameter)
Z,2 =  (1 -  X)‘z ) J  QPRIM t_j (2.7)
Z ,i =  A'
w =  (a S) 
a — (a b n0)
S' =  (qj q2 #3 ^4 dl d2 d3 i/4)
( 2 .8 )
(2.9)
( 2 . 10)
Q
1 , if t is a time point associated with the first quarter
otherwise
(2 .11)
u =  (zq «2 ui ■■■ ut)
E(u) =  0
( 2 . 12)
5 All the variables in this paper are seasonally unadjusted.
6 H arvey (1981a, pp. 237-39) and G amaletsos (1973, pp. 251-53).
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V ( u ) =  a2u IT (2.13)
E (x (A)' u) =  0
u ~  N.I.D. (0, a2uIT) (2.14)
y -  (T X 1) vector of the dependent variable (quarterly gross product 
of the industrial sector at 1970 constant prices).
According to the available annual and quarterly data in the case of 
the Greek economy we assume that over the first T1 quarters only annual 
observations are available on y (QVINDC). We define T2 =  T -  7 \ and 
for algebraic convenience we assume that (Tj/4) is an integer. We split the 
specification (2.3) as:
where yp is a ^  X 1 vector giving the first Tx (quarterly) observations on 
y, etc.
In the suggested time disaggregation approach we estimate simulta­
neously the under estimation parameters w and the “missing” under disaggre­
gation quarterly observations yp taking into account all the available infor­
mation (i.e. the existing by assumption {TJ4) annual observations on y) 
This approach is suggested by Anderson (1957) and further extended by 
Sargan-Drettakis (1974), Gilbert (1977) and Tserkezos (1989a). This states 
that under normality of the residuals of (2 .3 ) we may treat the yp “missing” 
under time disaggregation quarterly observations of the gross industrial 
product as unknown parameters which have to be estimated simultaneously 
with the other parameters (w) of the quarterly model (2.15) taking into 
account the available annual observations (if they are available).
By minimizing the sum of squares function
F =  (ym -  x (A) w)' (ym -  x (A) w)
where
(2.16)
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with respect to yp and the unknown parameters w taking into account the 
annual available information on yp formulated by the relation:
Cyp =  y f  (2.17)
(yf : (TJ4)  annual available observations of y)
If the model is correctly specified, we obtain consistent7 and asymptotically 
efficient estimators of the “missing” (quarterly) observations yp and the 
parameters of the under estimation (quarterly) specification (2.3).
The matrix C is a (TJ4 X Tx) aggregation 8 matrix of the form:
C =
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 ............ 0000
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 ............ 0000
000000001111....0000 (2.18)
oooooooo........ m i
We are able to prove (Appendix A) that this minimization procedure 
leads to the following disaggregated data estimator:
^P =  Ti +  Up U) ~ (A)) w (2.19)
y x =  C  (C C r 'C y p (2 .2 0 )
xj (A) =  C 'iC C Y 'C x p (A) (2 .2 1 )
Thus, given A and conditional upon the estimated vector of coefficients 
w, we may estimate the (Tx) disaggregeted quarterly observations yp by 
adding to the (Tx) observed quarterly averages y x the (Tt) weighted (with 
the estimation vector w) deviations of the explanatory variables xp (A) from 
their quarterly averages x1 (A), i.e. (xp (A) — x1 (A).
The relation (2.19) can be written as:
yp -  xp (A) w =  jq — xp (A) w (2 .2 2 )
which is substituted indo the unconstrained Sum of Squares function (2.16) 
to obtain:
7 Sargan and Drettakis (1974, p. 39).
8 For more about these Time-Aggregation relations using matrix approach, see: G ilbert 
(1977, pp. 223-25) and Tserkezos (1989a, pp. 375-78).
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F ~  y  1 -  *1 U) W ) '  (yx -  Xj (A) W ) +
+  O'? ~ U m>)' (y£ -  x£ (A) w) (2.23)
which is immediately recognized as the function that, given A, is minimized 
by ordinary least squares estimation of equation (2.15) after replacing 
both the disaggregated quarterly observations y$  and the corresponding 
values of the exogenous variables xp by their quarterly averages y. and 
x1 (A) respectively.
The specification (2.15) may be estimated directly using standard re­
gression packages (TSP; RATS, SPSS, ... etc.); for given values of A what is 
required is the replacement of both the missing quarterly data and the 
corresponding values of the exogenous variables by their quarterly averages. 
Of course, degrees of freedom correction will be necessary.
3. Quarterly Estimates of the Gross Industrial Product
Assuming that quarterly data for the domestic gross industrial product 
are not available for the subperiod 1975.1, ..., 1979.IV, we applied the 
missing data technique to estimate the parameters of the specification 
(2.3) and the time disaggregated observations in order to make comparisons 
with the already existing actual quarterly data.
Using relation (2.22) on the basis of specification (2 .1 ), we obtained 
the estimates of specification (2.3) and the “missing” under time disaggrega­
tion quarterly data for the subperiod T{ =  1975.1, ..., 1978.IV (Table 1 ) 
In order to compare the disaggregated quarterly data with the actual 
ones using some well known techniques, we expressed the variables of 
iable 1 as relative (percentage) changes, i.e.
p, =  ( M E P C ,  -  QVINDCt_ f \ „ _  (  QVINDC, -  QVINDC,
( QVINDC,_j J a‘ - {  QVINDQri
with
Pi =  Disaggregated relative percentage changes 
at ~  Actual relative percentage changes
and
et — Pt ~ at (Error of relative percentage changes)
A graphical presentation of the actual and the disaggregated quarterly
QUARTERLY DISAGGREGATION OF THE GREEK INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT 463
Table 1
ACTUAL AND DISAGGREGATED QUARTERLY DATA FOR THE GREEK 
GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT (Period 1975.1, 1978.IV).
Billion drachmae at 1970 prices
Actual Disaggregated Actual Disaggregated
QVINDC FQVINDC QVINDC FQVINDC
1975: 1 25.6480 25.5466 1977: 1 29.2580 29.9419
1975: 2 26.6310 26.3857 1977: 2 30.5170 30.0290
1975: 3 27.0550 27.2025 1977: 3 30.9570 30.8759
1975: 4 28.2020 28.4011 1977: 4 32.4920 32.3772
1976: 1 27.5820 27.5529 1978: 1 31.5530 31.2901
1976: 2 29.4370 28.9335 1978: 2 32.0240 32.2260
1976: 3 29.2090 29.6800 1978: 3 32.4520 32.6559
1976: 4 31.3720 31.4336 1978: 4 34.9420 34.7990
Source-. QVINDC: Quarterly National Accounts of Greece. FQVINDC: Author’s Estimates.













observations as levels and as relative percentage changes are given in Figs. 1 
and 2  respectively.
A quantitative measure of the forecast error et is the Mean Square 
Error 9 which can be easily mathematically decomposed into three constit-
For more see Maddala (1977, pp. 343-47).
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Figure 2. Actual and disaggregate QVINDC  of the Greek economy (billion drachmae at 
1970 prices).
Variables as relative percentage changes
1975 1978 1977 1978
uent elements, each of which has a very distinct interpretation. In mathe­
matical terms this decomposition 10 can be written in the following way:
MSE =  ((1/(T -  1)) Z (pt -  at)2) =  UmMSE +  Us MSE +  Uc MSE
=  (p — a)2 +  (Sp -  Sa)2 +  2 (1  — r) SaSp (3.1)
and
Um =  (p — a)2/MSE : Bias proportion
Us =  (Sp — Sa)2/MSE : Variance proportion
Uc =  2 (1  — r) SaSp/MSE : Covariance proportion
1 =  Um +  Us +  Uc (3.2)
Using the data of Table 1 in order to evaluate the relation (3.1) we obtain 11 
the following results:
1. =  0.000546 +  0.19948 +  0.80046 (3.3)
Equation (3.3) indicates that 0.05 percent of the Mean Square Error 
results from bias, 19.9 percent from errors of variation and 80 percent from
10 p, a-. Means p , and a,.
Sp, Sa: Standard Deviations of p ,  and at. 
r: Correlation coefficient o f p , and a,.
11 Theil’s Inequality coefficient L +  was 0.23786.
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less than perfect correlation of actual and predictive values. The small bias 
component tends to confirm the conclusion that there is no persistence 
tendency to incorrectly estimate the magnitude percentage changes of the 
dependent variable.
In relation with the above analysed criteria in Fig. 3 and 4 we give the 
Control-Chart and the Prediction-Realization Diagram 12. Examining the
Figure 3. Control chart of error of relative percentage changes.
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scatter diagram we see the obvious correlation between the observed and 
the forecasted behavior. Out of 15 quarterly observations the direction of 
change of the dependent variable was correctly forecasted 14 times.
Using relation (2 .2 2 ) on the basis of specification (2.1) we obtained 
the disaggregated quarterly observations of the gross industrial product of 
the Greek economy for the subperiod Tl =  1963.1, ..., 1974.IV (Table 2).
Using the aggregation matrix C it is not difficult to see that the quarter­
ly estimates of Table 2 are consistent with the annual observations of that 
period.
Table 2
GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT OF THE GREEK ECONOMY.
(Period 1963.1, ..., 1974.IV) (Seasonally Unadjusted Data)
Billion drachmae at 1970 prices
QVINDC QVINDC
1963: 1 8.58452 1969: 1 16.9813
1963: 2 9.41297 1969: 2 18.8468
1963: 3 11.4336 1969: 3 19.4899
1963: 4 10.9469 (40.387) 1969: 4 19.6209 (74.939)
1964: 1 9.94259 1970: 1 18.3702
1964: 2 10.8830 1970: 2 19.8309
1964: 3 13.0448 1970: 3 21.5546
1964: 4 12.2766 (46.147) 1970: 4 21.2203 (80.976)
1965: 1 11.2375 1971: 1 20.8229
1965: 2 12.5787 1971: 2 22.0059
1965: 3 14.0410 1971: 3 24.2419
1965: 4 13.1898 (51.047) 1971: 4 23.7313 (90.802)
1966: 1 11.4233 1972: 1 23.3201
1966: 2 13.7710 1972: 2 25.0495
1966: 3 14.8512 1972: 3 26.1403
1966: 4 13.8255 (53.871) 1972: 4 27.4450 (101.955)
1967: 1 12.9101 1973: 1 26.2725
1967: 2 14.2895 1973: 2 28.2758
1967: 3 15.0521 1973: 3 29.9170
1967: 4 14.5824 (56.836) 1973: 4 29.9018 (114.367)
1968: 1 14.5667 1974: 1 25.8875
1968: 2 16.2967 1974: 2 25.4590
1968: 3 17.6096 1974: 3 24.8482
1968: 4 16.9660 (65.439) 1974: 4 25.5132 (101.708)
* Data in parentheses are the actual annual data.
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4. Conclusions
In this study following a well known “related series missing data” 
approach we obtained some quarterly estimates of the gross industrial pro­
duct of the Greek economy at 1970 constant prices (period 1963.1- 
1974.IV), taking into account all the available information (functional form, 
annual aggregates). These quarterly data have the advantage that aggregated 
over time with the time aggregation matrix C they give exactly the actual 
annual basis data.
We may extend the suggested time-disaggregation approach to estimate 
(disaggregate) the missing quarterly observations of the gross industrial 
product and other macroeconomic variables of the Greek economy using 
more flexible 13 distributed lag models.
Finally the suggested time disaggregation technique can be useful in 
the Greek National Statistical Service (Quarterly National Accounts Unit) to 
improve the quality of the published quarterly provisional data (Tserkezos, 
1989a).
APPENDIX A
A Lagrangian 14 procedure for minimising (2.16) subject to (2.17) is used:
FLagr. =  (ym- x  (A) w)' (ym- x  (A) w) -  2V  (Cy? -  j f ) (A. 1)
where L is a (T J4) vector of the Lagrangian multipliers, with 15
C =  (fpj/4 ® e 4) (A.2)
e4 =  (1, 1, 1, 1)' (A.3)
Differentiating (A .l) with respect to y f ,  setting equal to zero, after some algebraic manipula­
tions we obtain the constrained equation:
7?  -  x f  (A) w  -  C'L =  0 (A.4)
Premultiply (A.4) by C and recalling that:
Cy? = y i A =  Cjq (A.5)
15 Tserkezos (1989a, pp. 5-25).
14 For more, see: Sargan-Drettakis (1974, pp. 42-44), G ilbert (1977, pp. 225) and 
Tserkezos (1989a, pp. 374-75).
15 ®  denotes the Kronecker product, for more see: H arvey (1981a, pp. 358-59).
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we may solve (A.4) for L to obtain:
L ( C C T 1C ' ( y f - x ? U ) w )  (A.6)
(A.6) substituted into (A.4) gives:
y ?  =  xp (A) w +  C  (C C T 1 C y fi -  C  (CC')"1 Cxp (A) w  (A.7)
Using the time-aggregation relations (2.20) and (2.21):
ÿ i  =  C' (C C 'r 'C y Ÿ  and Xj (A) =  C  (CC')_1 C x f (A) 
the relation (A.7) can be written 16 as:
7 ?  = ÿ \  +  (*?W ) -  * i (A)) w  <A -8)
The Data
A PPENDIX B
The data used in this study are annual and quarterly, seasonally-unadjusted observations on 
real 1970 prices. These were collected from the National Accounts (Annual and Quarterly) and the 
National Statistical Service of the Greek Ministry of National Economy and are defined as
QVINDC, =  Quarterly gross product o f the industrial sector of the Greek economy at 1970 
constant prices over the period 1975.1, ..., 1987.IV.
QPRIM, =  Quarterly index of industrial production, Branches 20-39 and base 1970 =  100 
over the period 1963.I-1987.IV.
AVINDC, =  Annual gross domestic product of the industrial sector at 1970 constant prices 
over the period 1963-1987.
These variables are given in Table 4.
The specification used to interrelate the under time disaggregation variable QVINDC, (Gross
Industrial Product) and the independent variable QPRIM, (Index of Industrial Production) was: 
00 4
QVINDC, =  a +  Z ' hj QPEIM '_j +  iq, +  d, TRt) Q„ +  y  DUM75t +  u, (B .l)
t  =  1963.1, ..., 1987.IV
with
and
hj = hvj Vj =  (1 -  A) X’, X v j =  1 0 <  A <  1





16 For more, see: G ilbert (1977), pp. 224) and Tserkezos (1989a, pp. 376).
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tABLE 3
ESTIMATES OF SPECIFICATION (B.l) USING DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS 
ABOUT THE AVAILABLE QUARTERLY AND ANNUAL DATA
Available Data
T =  1975.I-1987.IV T =  1975.I-1987.IV T =  1963.1-1987.IV
T , =  0 T ! =  1975.I-1978.IV Tj =  1963.I-1974.IV
T2 =  1975.I-1987.IV T2 =  1979.I-1987.IV T2 =  1975.1-1987.IV
a 4.389342 3.488610 0.81438
[2.6] [2.4] [2.5]
b 0.1577675 0.1635201 0.1936077
[17.4] [20.3] [35.5]
1 0.300000 0.33000 0.22000
[n.c] [n.c] [n.c]
<7l -  1.043762 -  0.967418 -  0.44022
[3.4] [3.2] [2.6]
72 -  0.7613997 -  0.811447 -  0.494967
[2.6] [2.7] [1.78]
73 -  0.514996 -  0.424701 -  0.146256
[2.8] [2.5] [2.8]
r — — -  2.724905
[2.3]
R2 0.9106534 0.91185946 0.98741063
D.W. 1.457 1.523 1.4335
[n.c] =  non computed 
[ ] =  /-statistic
R2 =  Corrected squared coefficient of multiple correlation 
D.W. =  Durbin-Watson statistic
All the computations were carried out using the Regression Analysis Time Series Program 
(RATS).
The estimates of the above specification 17 using different assumptions about the available 
quarterly and annual data are given in Table 3
The relatively small estimated D.W s of Table 3 indicates the existence of autocorrelation in 
the residuals of the model (first order autoregressive scheme). This is due to misspecification of 
the residuals of the model (2.1), but as we explained earlier, in Greece there are not many 
available time series in quarterly basis to be used as independent variables in specification (2.1).
17 DUM13t: Dummy variable to account for the constant term structural shift after the 1973 
oil crisis.
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APPENDIX C
Table 4
Gross Industrial Product * Index of Gross Industrial Product * Index of
Billion Drachmae Industrial Billion Drachmae Industrial
at 1970 prices Production at 1970 prices Production
20-39 20-39
1970=100 1970 =  100
Time Quarterly Annual** Quarterly Time Quarterly Quarterly
1963: 1 8.58452 45.7333 1972: 1 23.3201 115.933
1963: 2 9.41297 52.1667 1972: 2 25.0495 126.867
1963: 3 11.4336 61.8333 1972: 3 26.1403 129.367
1963: 4 10.9469 (40.387) 55.5667 1972: 4 27.4450 (101.955) 135.867
1964: 1 9.94259 50.5000 1973: 1 26.2725 134.967
1964: 2 10.8830 58.1000 1973: 2 28.2758 148.133
1964: 3 13.0448 68.5333 1973: 3 29.9170 153.833
1964: 4 12.2766 (46.147) 60.2667 1973: 4 29.9018 (114.367) 151.100
1965: 1 11.2375 55.8333 1974: 1 25.8875 147.067
1965: 2 12.5787 65.9667 1974: 2 25.4590 145.500
1965: 3 14.0410 71.3667 1974: 3 24.8482 139.800
1965: 4 13.1890 (51.047) 63.4667 1974: 4 25.5132 (101.708) 144.367
1966: 1 11.4233 62.9667 1975: 1 25.6480 143.700
1966: 2 13.7710 78.8333 1075: 2 26.6310 149.633
1966: 3 14.8512 80.4667 1975: 3 27.0550 151.600
1966: 4 13.8255 (53.871) 71.9333 1975: 4 28.2020 157.233
1967: 1 12.9101 68.5667 1976: 1 27.5820 155.867
1967: 2 14.2895 78.8000 1976: 2 29.4370 166.367
1967: 3 15.0521 79.6333 1976: 3 29.2090 166.300
1967: 4 14.5824 (56.836) 75.1000 1976: 4 31.3720 176.967
1968: 1 14.5667 71.3333 1977: 1 29.2580 162.700
1968: 2 16.2967 83.7667 1977: 2 30.5170 165.333
1968: 3 17.6096 87.7000 1977: 3 30.9570 169.533
1968: 4 16.9660 (65.439) 81.3333 1977: 4 32.4920 177.733
1969: 1 16.9810 79.0000 1978: 1 31.5530 173.400
1969: 2 18.8468 92.0667 1978: 2 32.0240 180.667
1969: 3 19.4899 91.5000 1978: 3 32.4520 179.000
1969: 4 19.6209 (74.939) 91.0000 1978: 4 34.9420 193.900
1970: 1 18.3702 90.2667 1979: 1 33.5640 186.900
1970: 2 19.8309 100.200 1979: 2 35.1130 196.500
1970: 3 21.5546 107.133 1979: 3 34.5650 191.000
1970: 4 21.2203 (80.976) 102.233 1979: 4 35.6000 197.167
1971: 1 20.8229 99.6333 1980: 1 33.8560 190.567
1971: 2 22.0059 108.267 1980: 2 34.2680 198.533
1971: 3 24.2419 118.867 1980: 3 33.0570 191.767
1971: 4 23.7313 (98.802) 112.167 1980: 4 34.3050 197.667
* : Data in parentheses are the disaggregated quarterly observations of the Gross Industrial 
Product.
**: Actual Annual Data.
Source-. Quarterly National Accounts and National Statistical Service of Greece (Ministry of 
National Economy).
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Table 4 (Continued)
Gross Industrial Product * 
Billion Drachmae at 1970 prices
Index of Industrial Production 
Branches 20-39 1070 =  100
Time Quarterly Annual * Quarterly
1981: 1 32.0810 182.067
1981: 2 33.1380 195.567
1981: 3 33.9380 192.600
1981: 4 34.2840 199.000
1982: 1 31.9060 184.733
1982: 2 32.4220 184.467
1982: 3 32.1570 173.567
1982: 4 33.9030 187.667
1983: 1 31.5220 178.033
1983: 2 31.8810 181.833
1983: 3 32.7870 178.967
1983: 4 34.4250 186.967
1984: 1 32.0930 180.900
1984: 2 32.6390 187.500
1984: 3 33.3870 180.600
1984: 4 34.0950 190.733
1985: 1 32.8340 175.733
1985: 2 33.4990 186.700
1985: 3 34.4530 191.433
1985: 4 36.2700 197.867
1986: 1 33.3570 181.567
1986: 2 34.4110 196.333
1986: 3 34.2580 187.017
1986: 4 35.2670 192.476
1987: 1 33.0970 171.928
1987: 2 33.6460 178.369
1987: 3 33.2250 181.619
1987: 4 34.9800 191.372
*: Data in parentheses are the disaggregated quarterly observations of the Gross Industrial
Product.
**: Actual annual data.
Source-. Quarterly National Accounts and National Statistical Service of Greece (Ministry of 
National Economy).
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DISAGGREGAZIONE TRIMESTRALE DEL PRO D O TTO  INDUSTRIALE 
LORDO GRECO ANNUALE CON L’USO D I SERIE COLLEGATE
Dati trimestrali sulle variabili macroeconomiche chiave dell’economia greca 
sono disponibili dopo il quarto trimestre 1974. In questo articolo si propone una 
tecnica per la disaggregazione temporale di queste variabili su base annuale 
fondata sulla tecnica dei dati “collegati mancanti”. La metodologia applicata forni­
sce stime trimestrali del prodotto industriale lordo greco per il periodo 1963.1- 
1974.IV. I dati trimestrali disaggregati sommati risultano coerenti con i corrispon­
denti valori annuali.
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U N  COSTANTE 
I M P E G N O .
DI Q U A LIT À
A. Lorenzetti, Effetti del Buon governo in città
B IL A N C I0 19 9 2
in miliardi di Lire
RACCOLTA TOTALE 1 2 .934 +  9 %
IM PIEG H I 12.021 +  120/0
RISULTATO LO RDO
DI G E STIO N E 239 +  170/0
PA TR IM O N IO  SO CIALE 934 +  7 %
d i  CENTRORANCA
MILANO - Ancona - Bari - Bologna - Firenze 
Napoli - Novara - Roma - Vicenza
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FONSPA BILANCIO 1992
Si è tenuta a Roma, mercoledì 28 aprile, 
l’Assemblea ordinaria degli Azionisti del 
Credito Fondiario e Industriale - FONSPA 
(Gruppo IRI), che ha approvato il Bilancio 
chiuso al 31 dicembre 1992.
Nell’esercizio l’attività è stata soddisfacente 
pur in una fase caratterizzata da un pro­
gressivo deterioramento delle condizioni 
dell’economia sia nel mercato produttivo 
che in quello finanziario.
I nuovi finanziamenti sono stati pari a 2.402 
miliardi (+5,7%), di cui 202,9 miliardi riferiti 
alla nuova attività di credito industriale ini­
ziata ad aprile. A fine esercizio la consisten­
za degli impieghi ha raggiunto i 9.088,3 mi­
liardi (+18,4%). Il margine lordo da mutui e 
impieghi è stato di 268,7 miliardi (+22,2%). 
L’incremento del margine netto è stato più 
contenuto (+8,4%) in relazione all'innalza­
m ento d e ll’accan tona­
mento al Fondo rischi 
da 0,3% a 0,4% degli 
impieghi.
L’utile netto, compre­
so quello della sezione 
Opere Pubbliche, as­
sorbita alla fine del pri­
mo trimestre, risulta di 
46,9 miliardi contro i 
63 miliardi del prece- . 
dente esercizio. Il de­
crem ento  è conse­
guente alla crescita delle 
quote di ammortamento degli immobili 
(+4,7 miliardi), nonché all’indeducibilità del- 
l’ILOR dall’imposta sul reddito (4 miliardi), al­
la nuova imposta sul patrimonio delle im­
prese (6 miliardi) e alla citata prudenziale po­
litica degli accantonamenti (+10,2 miliardi). 
Verrà distribuito un dividendo di 200 lire 
per azione, uguale a quello dell’anno scor­
so, oltre, ai sensi del secondo comma del- 
l’art. 2357 ter c.c., la quota afferente le azio-
F0NSPA - Consistenza finanziam eti a fine periodo 
(importi in miliardi dilire)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
ni proprie eventualmente ancora in p ro ­
prietà al 17 maggio 1993. Giorno in cui lo 
stesso verrà messo in pagamento, su pre­
sentazione dei certificati azionari, ai sensi 
delle disposizioni di legge, presso la Banca 
Commerciale Italiana, il Credito Italiano e le 
altre consuete Casse incaricate, nonché 
presso la Monte Titoli Spa (per i titoli dal­
la stessa amministrati) e la Sede sociale 
dell’Istituto. A seguito del 
r in n o v o  p e r  d e c o r­
renza triennale, il 
Consiglio di am­
m in i s t r a z io n e  
nom ina to  d a l­
l ’A ssem b lea  ha 
eletto alla carica 
di P re s id en te  
Mario Piovano ed a 
quella di Vice Presidente Oliviero Prunas. 
Direttore Generale è Antonio Masala.
La documentazione di cui alla deliberazione 
CONSOB n. 5553 del 14.11.1991 è depositata 
presso la Sede sociale in Via C. Colombo, 80 e 
presso il Consiglio di Borsa sedi di Milano e Ro­
ma. Copia della stessa verrà inviata a chiunque ne 
faccia richiesta.
1991 1992 VAR %
Impieghi. 7.677,6 9.088,3 +18,4
Margine lordo 220,0 268,7 +22,2
Margine netto 150,3 162,9 + 8,4
Fondi propri 1.074,6 1.136,1 + 5,7
FON
SPA
CREDITO FO N D IA R IO  
E IN D U S T R IA L E  s .p .a .
ISTITUTO PER I FINANZIAMENTI A  MEDIO E LUNGO TERMINE
L’INTRAPRENDENZA PRENDE FORMA
RELAZIONI DI BILANCIO 4 7 9
ISTITUTO CENTRALE DELIE BANCHE POPOLARI ITALIANE
SOCIETÀ PER AZIONI
CAPITALE SOCIALE E RISERVE AL 31 DICEMBRE 1992: L. 281.123.214.845 
Direzione Generale: MILANO - Corso Europa, 18 
Ufficio di Roma e Sede Sociale: ROMA - Via Donizetti, 12/a - 14
Tribunale di Roma: Registro società n. 526/41 - Fascicolo 598/41 
Anno di Fondazione: 1939
BILANCIO 1992 (lire miliardi)
ATTIVO
Corrispondenti debitori e fondi presso
l’Istituto di Emissione 1.781,5
Titoli di proprietà 834,6
Partecipazioni 165,9
Crediti verso l’Erario 92,3
Immobili 71,7
Mobili e impianti 5,3
Voci diverse 126,3
3.077,6
Conti impegni, rischi e d’ordine 71.427,8
74.505,4
PASSIVO
Corrispondenti creditori e assegni
circolari 2.685,6




Capitale sociale e riserve 281,1
Utile netto 6,3
3.077,6
Conti impegni, rischi e d’ordine 71.427,8
74.505,4
L’8 maggio 1993 ha avuto luogo in Roma, presso la sede sociale dell’Istituto, l’assemblea ordinaria degli 
Organismi associati (Banche Popolari ed Istituzioni della Categoria) che ha approvato il bilancio dell’esercizio 1992.
Dopo ammortamenti, svalutazioni titoli, accantonamenti ai fondi rischi ed assegnazione di L. 8,5 miliardi alla 
« Riserva disponibile », è stata deliberata la seguente ripartizione dell’utile netto di L. 6,3 miliardi:
— distribuzione di un dividendo di L. 125 alle n. 8.287.0&3 azioni da nominali L. 500 cadauna costituenti il capitale 
sociale;
— attribuzione alla « Riserva legale » di L. 4,5 miliardi, per aumentarla a L. 42 miliardi;
— ulteriori assegnazioni, ivi compresa la destinazione di una quota ad incremento del « Fondo assistenza Banche 
Popolari ».
Nel corso dell’assemblea si è trattato anche dell’attività esplicata, durante l’anno 1992, dalle tre principali società 
al cui capitale partecipa l’Istituto, società che per la rilevanza delle quote partecipative possedute rientrano tra le 
«collegate» (CENTROSIM, ITALFONDIARIO, SECETI).
Gli organi sociali delllstpopolbanche, dopo le nomine deliberate l’8 maggio 1993, risultano così composti: 
CONSIGLIO DI AMMINISTRAZIONE
Presidente: Gr. Uff. Rag. Carlo P a v e s i ; Vice Presidenti: Doti. Italo Giorgio Bocci - Comm. Rag. Giovanbattista 
F io r e n t in i ; Consiglieri: Gr. Uff. Dott. Rag. Vittorio A u l e n t i - Cav. Gr. Cr. Uff. Dott. Rag. Giuseppe Antonio 
B a n fi - Dott. Paolo B o r e l l i - Dott. Cesare C a l e t t i  - Comm. Dott. Giovanni C a r t ia  - Gr. Uff. Dott. Antonio 
C e o l a  - Avv. Pier Luigi C o l iz z i - Comm. Rag. Giovanni D e  C e n s i - Gr. Uff. Rag. Giandomenico Di Sa n t e  - Gr. 
Uff. Rag. Edoardo F ani - Comm. Dott. Josef F ro sc h m a y r  - Avv. Giuseppe I m p e r a t o r i - Marchese Dott. Franco 
L u c if e r o  - Cav. Prof. Dott. Renato M a st r o st ef a n o  - Comm. Dott. Angelo M azza - Avv. Vincenzo M e r l in o  - Gr. 
Uff. Dott. Vincenzo M osca  - Comm. Pietro N iada  - Dott. Piermaria P a c c h io n i - Cav. Gr. Cr. Dott. Giuseppe 
P e d r o n i - Gr. Uff. Prof. Dott. Federico P e p e  - Cav. Gr. Cr. Prof. Avv. Piero S c h l e s in g e r  - Cav. del Lav. Gr. Cr. 
Rag. Lino V e n in i  - Comm. Dott. Giuseppe V ig o r e l l i . Segretario del Consiglio: Dott. Franco D e  M a jo .
COLLEGIO SINDACALE
Presidente: Comm. Rag. Ottavio F o n t a n e s i; Sindaci effettivi: Comm. Rag. Pietro A g n o l u z z i - Dott. Domenico 
M o n to sc h i - Rag. Adriano M o ra  - Cav. del Lav. Dott. Matteo P it a n z a ; Sindaci supplenti: Cav. Rag. Armando 
B e n e d e t t i  - Comm. Dott. Antonio C it a r e l l a .
DIREZIONE GENERALE
Direttore Generale: Dott. Franco D e  M a jo ; Vice Direttore Generale: Dott. Luciano B r u s a f e r r i.
ISTITUTO CENTRALE DI BANCHE E BANCHIERI
Sede Sociale e Direzione Generale: Milano, Corso Monforte, 34 




Depositi e conti correnti 
con istituzioni crediti­
zie:
-  controllate 20.440.251.003
-  altre 2.800.734.080.068
Finanziamenti ad istitu­
zioni creditizie 
Titoli di proprietà 
Partecipazioni 
Crediti verso clienti:
-  società controllate 35.550.868.982
-  altri 339.513.028.669
Crediti verso l’erario 
Altri crediti 
Immobili
Impianti e macchine 




















Conti impegni e rischi 
Conti d’ordine:
-  Depositari titoli
-  Titoli e valori in de­
posito a cauzione
-  Titoli e valori in de-
?psito a garanzia itoli e valori in de-

























da istituzioni creditizie 
Depositi e conti correnti 
di clienti:
15.408.423.221
-  società controllate 3.028.389.407










ex L. 408/90 
Imposta sostit.
4.428.807.821
ex L. 413/91 878.572.216
Fondo imposte e tasse 
Fondo trattamento 






— Impianti e macchine 7.659.358.643
— Mobili e arredi 2.702.657.421
35.658.963.779




Fondo oscillazione valori 
Patrimonio:
150.000.000
— Capitale sociale 86.738.730.000
— Riserva legale 49.010.199.915




monetaria L. 1983/72 
— Fondo acquisto azioni
8.800.000.000
proprie
— Fondo plusvalenze 
L. 1983/169
— Fondo per rischi 
bancari generali
— Avanzo ai fusione 
Immist
— Avanzo di fusione 
S.P.B.
— Fondo sovrapprezzo 
azioni
— Sovrapprezzo azioni 
S.P.B.
— Riserva Rivalutazione 
ex L. 408/90
— Riserva Rivalutazione 
ex L. 413/91
— Riserva ex L. 218/90
Utile dell’esercizio
Totale del passivo e 
del patrimonio
Conti impegni e rischi
Conti d’ordine:
— Titoli presso terzi
— Depositanti titoli e 
valori a cauzione
— Depositanti titoli e 
valori a garanzia
— Depositanti titoli e 
valori a custodia
— Moduli assegni circo­




























Bank of A m erica Tower - 1 8 °  piano  
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NEW YORK
650 Fifth A venu e -  25° piano - New  York N.Y. 10C
GRAND CAYMAN
c/o  filiale d i N ew  York
650 Fifth A venue - New  York N.Y. 10 0 19
Partecipazioni:
« BANKHAUS LÓBBECKE & CO.
Fasan en strasse 5 -  1000 Berlin o 12  
(2 agenzie a Berlino, filia li a Francoforte, 
Braunschw eig, M agdeburgo, M onaco d i B.)
• CARIPLO BANK INTERNATIONAL S.A.
1 2  R u e G o ethe -  16 3 7  Lussem burgo
• COMPAGNIE INTERNATIONALE DE BANQUE
4 2  R u e la B oétie -  75008 P arig i (Filiale a Lione)
EUROPA! KERESKEDELMI BANK Rt. EKB
7 / 1 3  U. H egyalja -  1 0 1 6  Bud ap est •
•  Partecipazioni d i controllo
£3 C A R IP L O
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BRUXELLES
A venue Lo u ise 2 5 0  - B .te 63 -  10 50  B ruxelles 
CHICAGO
19 0  South La S a lle  Street, Su ite 2890  
Ch icag o , IL  60603
FRANCOFORTE S/M
Gutleutstrasse 3 2  -  6000 Francoforte su l M eno 1 
MOSCA
Pereulok B o lsho y G nezdnikovsky 7 - 4 °  piano  
103009 M osca
PARIGI
10  R u e de la P aix -  75002 P arig i 
PECHINO
8 1 1  S cite  Tower -  2 2  Jianguom enw ai D a J ie  
100004 Pechino
SEOUL
O rientai Ch em ical B u ild in g -  3 ° piano  
50  So ko n g -D o n g C h u n g -K u  -  100070 Seo u l
TOKYO
Enokizaka B u ild in g  -  3 ° piano
1 2 - 1 2  Akasaka 1 -  Chom e -  M inato-K u, Tokyo 10 7
NEW BOOKS FROM THE IMF
Improving Tax Administration in Developing Countries
E d ite d  b y  R ic h a rd  M . B ir d  a n d  M ilk a  C a sa n eg ra  d e  J a n ts c h e r
Taxation, like politics, is the art of the possible—yet most public finance texts ignore the critical 
role played by tax administration in restoring macroeconomic balance and promoting equity and 
efficiency. This volume fills a gap in the literature by linking tax policy and tax administration 
reform and exploring ways to improve taxpayer compliance. The papers included in the volume 
were prepared for a symposium sponsored by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales of the Ministry of 
Finance of Spain.
ISBN 1-55775-317-2 Price: US$23.00
Public Expenditure Management
B y  A . P r e m c h a n d
Resource allocation and effective use of resources have been two major concerns of citizens, 
countries, and their governments. Public expenditure management systems have been largely 
organized with these two concerns in mind. This book examines these systems from the decision 
maker’s point of view and describes different management strategies. It supplements the author’s 
previous works on the subject—G o v e r n m e n t B u d g e tin g  a n d  E x p e n d itu r e  C o n tr o ls  (1983) and G o v ­
e rn m e n t F in a n c ia l M a n a g e m e n t (1990).
ISBN 1-55775-323-7 Price: US$20.00
Order from: Publication Services • Box No. XE-771 
International Monetary Fund • 700 19th Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20431, U.S.A. 
Tel. (202) 623-7430 • Fax (202) 623-7201
E D I Z I O N I  C E D A M  - P A D O V A
Recentissima
GAETANO SILVIA D ’AIETTI
INDIVIDUO, ISTITUZIONI, SCELTE PUBBLICHE
Problemi di razionalizzazione del comportamento 
dei soggetti pubblici nel processo decisionale.
Hayek, Simon, Buchanan e la svolta della « Public Choice ». 
L’economia della burocrazia, dell’informazione e 
il superamento del malfunzionamento delle istituzioni.
Prefazione d i F r a n c o  R o m a n i
(Collana di diritto e di economia pubblica.
Istituto di scienze finanziarie dell’Università di Palermo)
pp. XX-194
ISBN 88-13-17121-8 L. 26.000
IN VENDITA NELLE MIGLIORI LIBRERIE E PRESSO I NOSTRI AGENTI
Se lei vuole andare in Banca 24 ore al giorna 
7 giorni la settimana...
...Venga 
da noi!
La attendiamo presso 
la filiale della Banca 
Commerciale Italiana 
a lei più vicina: un 
nostro addetto sarò a 
disposizione per 
rispondere a ogni sua 








(*) Le condizioni sono riportate sui fogli informativi analitici disponibili 
presso tutti i nostri sportelli
L a  Banca Commerciale Italiana ha pensato a  lei, alle sue esigenze di tempo, di razionalità e  di efficienza aprendo  
BANCA N O N  STOP, uno sportello completam ente 
automatizzato.
Aperta sempre, giorno e  notte, BANCA N O N  STOP! *) le 
consente di effettuare versamenti o  prelievi, prenotare  
valuta e libretti di assegni, 
controllare il suo conto  
corrente, effettuare bonifici...
Con BANCA N O N  STOP 
il tempo è denaro: niente code, 
nessun vincolo di orario, 
massima facilità di utilizzo degli 




B A N C A  C O M M E R C IA L E  I T A L I A N A
L A  B A N C A  C O N  L A  Q U A L E  P A R L A R E
Società per A2ioni - Sede in Milano - Registro Società n. 2774 - Tribunale di Milano - Capitale Sociale L. 1.050.000.000.000 - Risei va Legale L. 420.000.000.000 - Banca di interesse Nazionale 
Gruppo Banca Commerciale italiana, iscritto all'AB» dei gruppi creditizi cod. 2002.4
STUDI IN MEMORIA DI TULLIO BAGIOTTI 


















Scritti di/Papers by: A. Agnati, M. Allais, H. Arndt, G. Barbieri, H. 
Bartoli, P. Bassetti, W.J. Baumol, G. Becattini, M.J. Beckmann, L. 
Beltran, G. Borelli, W. Braeuer, F. Brambilla, M. Bronfenbrenner, F. 
Bruni, F. Caffè, D. Cantarelli, U. Caprara, C. Carli, A. Cova, C. 
Dagum, V. Del Punta, G. Demaria, B. Dmytryshyn, P. Dubey, 
R. Faucci, G.R. Feiwel, V.P. Filios, V. Filosa, P.C. Fishburn, G. 
Fodella, G. Gaburro, O. Garavello, I. Gasparini, F. Gehrels, N. 
Georgescu-Roegen, A.L. Gitlow, G. Goisis, W.D. Grampp, H. 
Guitton, L.C. Harriss, K. Holbik, E. James, W. Krelle, R.E. Kuenne, 
G. Landenna, W. Leinfellner, L. Lenti, J.M. Letiche, S. Lombardini, 
G. Lunghini, M. Manfredini Gasparetto, J.A. Martellare, A. Martinelli, 
A. Mauri, F. Meacci, M.A.G. van Meerhaeghe, R. Molesti, A. 
Montesano, M. Monti, T. Negishi, H. Onoe, A. Pellanda, W.W. 
Pommerehne, P.L. Porta, A. Quadrio Curzio, R.E. Quandt, A.N. 
Rugina, O. Scarpai, C. Secchi, H.F. Sennholz, Y. Shionoya, M. 
Shubik, I. Sobel, S.C. Sufrin, M. Talamona, J. Tinbergen, J.E. 
Weinrich, S. Weintraub, J.K. Whitaker, B.S. Yamey, G. Zalin, S. 
Zamagni, O. Zinam.
1988. In 8°, pp. LX-1366 L. 120.000
EDIZIONI CEDAM - PADOVA
Al vostro fianco in Italia e nel mondo.
Se vi avvicinate al Banco di 
Napoli, scoprirete non solo 
una grande banca, ma soprat­
tutto una grande rete di servi­
zi. Oltre 750 sportelli in Italia 
e nel mondo, e terminali in­
telligenti in grado di gestire
milioni di operazioni in tem­
po reale, ovunque voi siate. 
E ancora, società che operano 
in tutti i settori della finanza 
e dei servizi. E una presenza 
consolidata anche nell’area 
del credito a medio e lungo
termine, a sostegno dell’agri­
coltura, dell’edilizia, dell’in­
dustria, delle opere pubbliche 
e dell’esportazione. Perché 
dal 1539 la nostra vocazione 
è quella di esservi sempre vi­
cini. In Italia e nel mondo.
BANCO diNAPO Ll
B A R C E L L O N A  C A Y M A N  I S L A N D S  F R A N C O F O R T E  H O N G  K O N G  
L O N D R A  M A D R I D  N E W  Y O R K  P A R I G I  B R U X E L L E S  L O S  A N G E L E S  
M O S C A . B A N C O  DI N A P O L I  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  S . A .  L U S S E M B U R G O
E D I Z I O N I  C E D A M P A D O V A
Recentissima:
ANNA LI DONNI
TEORIE ECONOMICHE E 
PROGRAMMAZIONE 
NELL’ESPERIENZA ITALIANA
Dalla ricostruzione agli anni ’60
(Collana di diritto e di economia pubblica.
Istituto di scienze finanziarie dell’Università di Palermo - 
Centro Europeo di Studi Economici e Sociali)
pp. X-162
ISBN 88-13-17122-6 L. 22.000
I n d ic e . — Introduzione. — I: Il dibattito sulla programmazione nel periodo della 
ricostruzione. — II: La programmazione negli anni ’50: teorie ed esperienze. -  III: 
L’avvio della programmazione (1960-1964). -  IV: La programmazione tra con­
giuntura e sviluppo. — Conclusioni. — Cronologia del programma quinquennale. — 
Bibliografia.
IN VENDITA NELLE MIGLIORI LIBRERIE E PRESSO I NOSTRI AGENTI
"Il m ig lio r 
in v estim en to  che 
l 'a z ien d a  po tesse  fare. 
D opo  d i me."
Chiamate chi ha il telefonino. Vi risponderà che ri­
sparmia tempo e denaro, che è migliorata la qualità 
del suo lavoro, che non soffre più di esaurimento ner­
voso per problemi di reperibilità. Insomma, vi comuni­
cherà che è un vero investimento produttivo. Soprat­
tutto per la riduzione del listino effettuata dalla SIP e 
per la gratuità del canone della Segreteria Telefonica 
Centralizzata e delle Chiamate Distinte: il nuovo servi­
zio che distingue le chiamate di lavoro da quelle pri­
vate. Vi parlerà del GSM, la nuova comunicazione eu­
ropea in movimento, raccontandovi come saperne 
di più chiamando il numero verde.
Finita la conversazione, non vi resterà altro che v i­
sitare i Negozi affiliati SIP. Avrete un'ulteriore te­
stimonianza di come la vita del telefonino sia cam­
biata e di come cambierà quella del vostro lavoro.
T elefon ino  SIP.
U n  in v es tim en to  g ià  p ro d u ttiv o .
Alimentazione e tecnologie: due fattori essenziali dello sviluppo 
econom ico, due strade che si intersecano nella strategia di 
Ferruzzi, il più internazionale dei gruppi italiani. Con le nostre 
attività nel campo agro-alimentare, nella chimica-farmaceutica, 
nell’energia, nel cemento e nel calcestruzzo siamo la prima realtà 
industriale italiana in Francia, negli Stati Uniti, in Canada, in 
Grecia, in Spagna e Portogallo, ed abbiamo raggiunto posizioni 
competitive in Germania, nel Benelux, nel Regno Unito, nelle 
giovani democrazie dell’Est europeo e persino nel Far East. Da 
noi le produzioni industriali si misurano in milioni di tonnellate 
o in milioni di pezzi e superano i consueti confini della geografia 
e della qualità. Se un giorno caricassimo su dei vagoni ferroviari
SUI MERCATI DI 
MEZZO MONDO
tutte le barbabietole, i semi oleosi e i cereali che trasformiamo in 
un anno, daremmo vita ad un convoglio di 6 6 0 .0 0 0  vagoni, 
lungo 11.000 chilometri, poco più della distanza tra Chicago e 
Parigi. E ancora. Se potessimo mettere in fila, una dopo l’altra, i 
5 0 0  m ilioni di bottiglie di olio di marca uscite dai nostri 
stabilimenti nel 1991 con i prestigiosi marchi Carapelli, Berio,
Teodora, Lara, Lesieur, Koipe, Elosua, Carbonell, otterremmo 
un perimetro di 35 .000  chilometri che sarebbe come fare per 4 
volte il giro delle 12 capitali dell’Europa Unita. Per questo noi di 
Ferruzzi, con gli alimenti, i farmaci, le plastiche e l’energia che 
produciamo ed un fatturato aggregato di 34 mila miliardi nel 
’92 , siamo oggi i primi italiani sui mercati di mezzo mondo.
F e r r u z z i
